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Wage Theft Criminalization 
Benjamin Levin* 
Over the past decade, workers’ rights activists and legal scholars have 
embraced the language of “wage theft” in describing the abuses of the 
contemporary workplace. The phrase invokes a certain moral clarity: theft 
is wrong. The phrase is not merely a rhetorical flourish. Increasingly, it has 
a specific content for activists, politicians, advocates, and academics: wage 
theft speaks the language of criminal law, and wage theft is a crime that 
should be punished. Harshly. Self-proclaimed “progressive prosecutors” 
have made wage theft cases a priority, and left-leaning politicians in the 
United States and abroad have begun to propose more criminal statutes to 
reach wage theft. 
In this Article, I examine the drive to criminalize wage theft. In the 
literature on workers’ rights, “wage theft” has been accepted uncritically as 
a distinct problem. But the literature fails to grapple with what makes wage 
theft clearly distinguishable from other abusive practices endemic to 
capitalism. For scholars concerned about worker power and economic 
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inequality, does classifying one class of conduct “wage theft” actually serve 
to legitimate the other injustices of the labor market?  
Further, the literature on wage theft has failed to reckon with the stakes 
of using criminal law and incarceration as the tools to remedy workplace 
violations. Absent from the discourse on wage theft is any engagement with 
one of the most vital contemporary movements to confront structural 
inequality: the fight to end mass incarceration. Despite insistence from 
proponents of wage theft criminalization that their focus is on society’s most 
marginalized, particularly poor people of color, these advocates have turned 
to a criminal system that is widely viewed as inimical to the interests of 
those same marginalized populations. Moreover, in calling for criminal 
prosecution, many commentators have embraced the same actors and 
institutions that have decimated poor communities and constructed a hyper-
policed population. By resituating wage theft within the literature on mass 
incarceration, I examine the limitations of using criminalization to redress 
economic injustices. I frame pro-criminalization arguments within the 
growing literature and activist discourse on decarceration and abolition, 
examining why criminalization of wage theft is and might be particularly 
problematic. 
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[A]s through this world I’ve wandered 
I’ve seen lots of funny men; 
Some will rob you with a six-gun, 
And some with a fountain pen.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Theft lies at the heart of capitalism. Bosses, not workers, own and sell 
the fruits of workers’ labor. Employment contracts aren’t entered into 
freely, as bosses are able to negotiate wages against a range of 
background legal rules that keep workers beholden, off-balance, and in 
a position of limited leverage. And once a worker actually earns her 
wage, she is taxed to pay for limited social services meted out by 
legislators who are highly responsive to the same industry forces that 
have depressed wages and worker power in the first place.  
Or, at least, that’s one way to frame the contemporary state of the 
market economy. Elite actors in the U.S. legal system don’t see things 
that way. Judges and legislators who craft legal rules hardly view 
capitalism or wage labor as some sort of exploitative dystopia.2 Rather, 
labor law, employment law, and a range of civil and criminal regulatory 
schemes purport to smooth out the sharp edges of the U.S. market 
economy. This web of laws emerged from the New Deal compromise: 
private markets and the primacy of private property persist, but, in 
exchange, some regulatory stopgaps have been put in place to check 
greed and recognize that freedom of contract could not necessarily be 
free in a world of unequal resource distribution.3  
 
 1 WOODY GUTHRIE, Pretty Boy Floyd, on FOLKWAYS: THE ORIGINAL VISION 
(Smithsonian Folkways Recordings 1989). 
 2 See, e.g., David L. Gregory, Labor Law and the Myth of a Value-Free Legal Doctrine, 
62 TEX. L. REV. 389, 394 (1983) (reviewing JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983)) (“In equating the interests of labor with those of 
ownership, purportedly to promote labor peace, judges have been either oblivious to 
historical reality or simply motivated by capitalist values to which they were personally 
committed.”); Kunal M. Parker, Context in History and Law: A Study of the Late 
Nineteenth-Century American Jurisprudence of Custom, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 473, 490 
(2006) (arguing that “judges instrumentalize[] law to further capitalist development”). 
 3 See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins 
of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 268-69 (1978) 
[hereinafter Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act] (describing the fraught place of 
labor law in legitimating capitalism); Seymour Martin Lipset, Roosevelt and the Protest 
of the 1930s, 68 MINN. L. REV. 273, 297 (1983) (arguing that President Roosevelt “helped 
preserve the basic integrity and legitimacy of American capitalism by his willingness to 
transform it by, as he once put it, making major changes that avoided a threat to the 
system itself”); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor 
Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509, 1516-17 (1981) (describing existing structures of labor law as 
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The rules of the game may not always be fair, but they have been set. 
And sometimes those rules are broken. Bosses overstep, and the 
inequalities that undergird the market are laid bare. The undocumented 
worker is not paid for weeks, while her employer threatens to call U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement if she dares to complain.4 The 
manual laborer is forced to endure unsafe working conditions with the 
assurance that she will finally get paid if she takes just one more shift.5 
The worker sees the numbers on her paycheck dwindle as her boss 
deducts money for workers’ compensation that never gets paid into the 
fund.6 These practices transcend the quotidian indignities of wage labor, 
scholars and activists tell us. These indignities constitute “wage theft.”7 
Workers’ rights activists and legal scholars have embraced the 
language of “wage theft” in describing the inequities and abuses of the 
contemporary workplace, particularly in low-wage markets.8 The 
 
“serv[ing] as a vehicle for the manipulation of employee discontent and for the 
legitimation of existing inequalities of power in the workplace”); cf. Catherine L. Fisk 
& Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with Its 
Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2034 (2009) 
(describing scholarly debates about just how radical federal labor law ever was). 
 4 See Llezlie Green Coleman, Procedural Hurdles and Thwarted Efficiency: 
Immigration Relief in Wage and Hour Collective Actions, 16 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 7 
(2013) (“In the 2009 study documenting wage theft in 3 major cities, nearly forty 
percent of the workers were undocumented, and such workers were nearly twice as 
likely to have experienced minimum wage violations.”). 
 5 See, e.g., Kathleen Kim, Beyond Coercion, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1558, 1571 (2015) 
(discussing reasons why undocumented laborers do not report unsafe labor conditions). 
 6 Cf. Catherine L. Fisk, Sustainable Alt-Labor, 95 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 7, 25 (2020) 
(discussing how “[u]nscrupulous, low-road employment agencies . . . engage in wage 
theft, charge exorbitant fees, [and] prevent workers from using unemployment 
insurance or workers’ compensation”). 
 7 See, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, From Weight Checking to Wage Checking: Arming 
Workers to Combat Wage Theft, 90 IND. L.J. 851, 851 (2015) (describing different forms 
of wage theft); Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare: The Disappearance of Low-Income Litigants 
from the Civil Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531, 1545 (2016) (“‘Wage theft’ is especially 
pervasive, as practices such as ‘[o]ff-the-clock work, meal and overtime violations, and 
time-shaving’ by unscrupulous employers unfairly shortchange low-wage workers.”). 
 8 See, e.g., Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, 
and Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1664-65 (2017) (noting concerns about wage theft 
in the ridesharing industry); Catherine L. Fisk, The Anti-Subordination Principle of Labor 
and Employment Law Preemption, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 601, 607-08 (2011) 
(describing “community activism around wage theft and minimum wage violations in 
service industries and in light manufacturing”); Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party 
Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 1 (2010) (“[W]orkers 
frequently experience wage-and-hour violations, or what the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office recently called ‘wage theft.’”); Nantiya Ruan, Facilitating Wage 
Theft: How Courts Use Procedural Rules to Undermine Substantive Rights of Low-Wage 
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phrase invokes a certain moral clarity: theft is wrong. Rather than 
relying on more complicated or radical moves that challenge the 
sanctity of private property, “freedom of contract,” or the inherent 
unfreeness of the “free market,”9 wage theft conjures up bad actors and 
innocent workers. Workers have earned their wages, and bosses have 
stolen them.10 The phrase implies an easy (and uncritical) analogy to 
the realm of property crime, bringing with it the same certainty that 
bosses have taken what does not belong to them and have therefore 
offended community morality.  
The phrase is not merely a rhetorical flourish. Increasingly, it has a 
specific content for activists, politicians, advocates, and academics: 
wage theft speaks the language of criminal law, and wage theft is a crime 
that should be punished. Harshly.11 Self-proclaimed “progressive 
prosecutors” have made wage theft cases a priority;12 left-leaning 
 
Workers, 63 VAND. L. REV. 727, 728 (2010) (“[T]he United States is suffering a crisis of 
wage theft against its workers.”). 
 9 See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, in SEXY 
DRESSING, ETC.: ESSAYS ON THE POWER AND POLITICS OF CULTURAL IDENTITY 83, 89-92 
(1993) [hereinafter The Stakes of Law] (examining several theories of economic 
distribution); Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 21 (1927) 
(arguing in favor of state regulation of private property rights); Robert L. Hale, Coercion 
and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 478 (1923) 
(arguing that income is acquired through societal coercion); Gary Peller, Privilege, 104 
GEO. L.J. 883, 895-96 (2016) (describing realist and post-realist critiques of “free 
markets”). See generally BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: 
ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998) (describing realist 
critiques of the “free market”); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: 
PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER (2011) (critiquing the notion of 
naturalized, “free” markets). 
 10 See KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING AMERICANS 
ARE NOT GETTING PAID — AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT, at xi (2011) (“Unscrupulous 
employers are stealing money from workers by cheating them of wages owed or not 
paying them at all and lying to public agencies about having employees.”).  
 11 In Australia, for example, a new bill backed by the Labor Party would impose 
criminal penalties of up to ten years in prison for wage theft. See Anna Patty & Noel 
Towell, Pressure Mounts on Federal Labor to Pledge to Criminalise Wage Theft, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD (May 25, 2018, 7:36 PM), https://www.smh.com.au/business/ 
workplace/pressure-mounts-on-federal-labor-to-pledge-to-criminalise-wage-theft-
20180525-p4zhjj.html [https://perma.cc/JBC4-WV4B]. 
 12 See, e.g., Devon Magliozzi, Wage Theft Is Criminal and Should Be Prosecuted, 
Tompkins DA Says, ITHACA VOICE (Feb. 6, 2019), https://ithacavoice.com/2019/02/wage-
theft-is-criminal-and-should-be-prosecuted-tompkins-da-says/ [https://perma.cc/HWZ7-
9EV7] (describing prosecutorial emphasis on wage theft); Chris Opfer, Prosecutors 
Treating ‘Wage Theft’ as a Crime in These States, BLOOMBERG LAW (June 26, 2018, 3:31 
AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/prosecutors-treating-wage-
theft-as-a-crime-in-these-states [https://perma.cc/AXX6-K7X6] (cataloging prosecutors 
who have prioritized wage theft); cf. Terri Gerstein, The Shutdown Shows Why 
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politicians in the United States and abroad have begun to propose more 
criminal statutes to reach wage theft;13 and attorneys and activists have 
embraced the rallying cry of #WageTheftIsACrime as a means of 
stressing the importance of their cause.14 
This Article is the first to examine comprehensively the drive to 
criminalize wage theft. In the literature on workers’ rights, “wage theft” 
has been accepted largely uncritically as a distinct problem in need of a 
 
Progressives Need to Make Labor-Law Enforcement a Top Priority, SLATE (Jan. 23, 2019, 
10:39 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/01/shutdown-wage-theft-unpaid-
federal-workers.html [https://perma.cc/GZ9J-X5KP] (calling for greater attention to 
criminal prosecution of wage theft). 
 13 See Stephen Lee, Policing Wage Theft in the Day Labor Market, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 655, 662-63 (2014) (“In recent years, advocates have pressured state legislators 
and local lawmakers to address the problem of wage theft through a jurisdiction’s 
criminal laws. In many instances, jurisdictions have passed new laws that specifically 
target wage theft, holding employers accountable for withholding payment.”); see, e.g., 
Keith Ellison, Opinion, Time to Address Wage Theft Is Now, WORKDAY MINN. (Apr. 29, 
2019), https://www.workdayminnesota.org/articles/op-ed-keith-ellison-time-address-
wage-theft-now [https://perma.cc/AB3E-TX5E] (“I strongly support a bill at the 
Legislature – HF 6, authored by Rep. Tim Mahoney, a union pipefitter, and SF 1933, 
authored by Sen. Bobby Joe Champion – that will give us more tools and resources to 
charge people with the crime of wage theft and prosecute it more aggressively.”); Anna 
Patty, Criminalisation of Wage Theft Likely to Backfire, Say Experts, SYDNEY MORNING 
HERALD (Jan. 3, 2019, 12:05 AM), https://www.smh.com.au/business/workplace/ 
criminalisation-of-wage-theft-likely-to-backfire-say-experts-20181212-p50lto.html 
[https://perma.cc/H5MZ-AGVK] (discussing Australian proposals to criminalize wage 
theft); Chase Woodruff, Colorado Lawmakers Advance Bill to Crack Down on Wage Theft, 
WESTWORD (Apr. 3, 2019, 9:47 AM), https://www.westword.com/news/colorado-
lawmakers-advance-bill-to-crack-down-on-wage-theft-11296675 [https://perma.cc/AY48-
AYCW] (discussing a Colorado proposal to “crack down on wage theft”). 
 14 See, e.g., Margot Roosevelt, Anaheim-Based Tow Truck Company Assessed $4.9 
Million in Back Wages, Penalties, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (July 26, 2017, 4:50 PM), 
https://www.ocregister.com/2017/07/26/anaheim-based-tow-truck-company-assessed-
4-9-million-in-back-wages-penalties/ [https://perma.cc/79GS-BNGY] (“The state 
commissioner has launched a website, wagetheftisacrime.com, to inform workers of 
their rights and employers of their responsibilities.”); Cal. Domestic Workers Coal. 
(@CADomesticWrkr), TWITTER (Sept. 7, 2018, 8:50 AM), https://twitter.com/ 
CADomesticWrker/status/1038092255435751424 [https://perma.cc/2A73-52XD] (“In 
California domestic workers are also organizing for dignity in the homecare industry 
and to ensure that their rights are respected! . . . #WageTheftIsACrime.”); Hand in 
Hand: The Domestic Emp’rs Network (@HiHemployers), TWITTER (Aug. 8, 2017, 12:51 
PM), https://twitter.com/HiHemployers/status/895009629004062720 [https://perma.cc/ 
5KQK-DGXN] (“#DefendDignity of domestic workers in CA! #WageTheftIsACrime.”); 
Sw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters (@SouthwestCarps), TWITTER (May 18, 2018, 4:37 PM), 
https://twitter.com/SouthwestCarps/status/997622210847166464 [https://perma.cc/ 
JMS7-MERD] (“All across the southwest hardworking middle class families are being 
cheated and respectable businesses are being forced out of business. 
#WageTheftIsACrime.”). 
  
2021] Wage Theft Criminalization 1435 
solution. But the literature fails to grapple with what makes wage theft 
clearly distinguishable from a range of other abusive practices that 
characterize workplace relations. For scholars concerned about worker 
power and economic inequality, does classifying one class of conduct 
“wage theft” actually serve to legitimate the other injustices of the labor 
market?15 Does framing other bosses or companies as victims of wage 
theft further naturalize the market and market orderings?16  
Troublingly, the literature and activism relating to wage theft have 
failed to reckon with the stakes of using criminal law and incarceration 
as the tools to remedy workplace violations.17 Strangely absent from the 
discourse on wage theft is any engagement with one of the most vital 
contemporary movements to confront structural inequality: the fight to 
end mass incarceration.18 Despite insistence from proponents of wage 
theft criminalization that their focus is on society’s most marginalized, 
particularly poor people of color and undocumented immigrants,19 
 
 15 See generally infra Part III.B.2. 
 16 See generally infra Part III.B.2. 
 17 One outlier here is a symposium piece by Stephen Lee which raises important 
concerns about interactions between police and undocumented workers who might 
have been victims of wage theft. See Lee, supra note 13, at 664-68. In a recently 
published essay that directly responds to an earlier version of arguments raised in this 
Article, César Rosado Marzán has defended the use of criminal law and criminal legal 
institutions as desirable vehicles for addressing wage theft. See César F. Rosado Marzán, 
Wage Theft as Crime: An Institutional View, 20 J.L. & SOC’Y 300, 300 (2020) [hereinafter 
Wage Theft as Crime].  
 18 This absence is even more striking given the increasing attention paid to the 
political economy of criminal law among critics of mass incarceration. See, e.g., HADAR 
AVIRAM, CHEAP ON CRIME: RECESSION-ERA POLITICS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN PUNISHMENT (2015) (discussing the fiscal history of mass incarceration); 
DARRYL K. BROWN, FREE MARKET CRIMINAL JUSTICE: HOW DEMOCRACY AND LAISSEZ FAIRE 
UNDERMINE THE RULE OF LAW (2015); RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, 
SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA (2007) (discussing “how, 
why, where, and to what effect one of the planet’s richest and most diverse political 
economies had organized and executed a prison-building and -filling plan”); HARCOURT, 
supra note 9 (recognizing a “fundamental duality between punishment and political 
economy”); NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES (2008); LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE 
POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY (2009). 
 19 See, e.g., REBECCA GALEMBA & RANDALL KUHN, UNIV. OF DENVER JOSEF KORBEL SCH. 
OF INT’L STUDIES, WAGE THEFT AND ITS VICTIMS IN COLORADO: RESEARCH 2 (2019), 
https://alightnet.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Wage-Theft-Long-Version-2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XB58-AH9S] (providing a breakdown of the wage and work profiles 
of day laborers); Shaun Boyd, ‘Put the Exploiters in Jail’: Wage Theft Bill Cracks Down on 
Employers, CBS DENVER (Apr. 2, 2019, 11:59 PM), https://denver.cbslocal.com/ 
2019/04/02/wage-theft-bill-colorado/ [https://perma.cc/UP5Z-NKJK] (quoting a 
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these advocates have turned to an institution (the criminal legal system) 
that is widely viewed as inimical to the interests of those same 
marginalized populations.20 Moreover, in calling for criminalization and 
criminal prosecution, many commentators have embraced the same 
actors and institutions that have decimated poor communities and used 
criminal law to construct a hyper-policed, hyper-incarcerated 
population.  
This Article teases out this tension by situating the drive to 
criminalize wage theft within a broader literature on “governing 
through crime.”21 Criminal justice scholarship has long grappled with 
the question of when criminalization and state violence are justified. 
Indeed, the dominant position of criminal justice commentators has 
been that criminal law has overflowed its banks, reaching too much 
conduct and authorizing punishments that are draconian and 
indefensible. Increasingly, discussions about criminal law and policy 
focus more on whether the system should be downsized or abolished 
than on what new areas it should address.22 Yet the drive to criminalize 
wage theft has — for the most part — ignored conversations and 
concerns about criminal law and its administration. The limited 
literature on wage theft has drawn largely from employment (and 
occasionally immigration) law, with scant attention to the details of 
criminal enforcement.23 In the workers’ rights narrative, prosecutors are 
 
legislative sponsor as stating that “[w]age theft is perpetrated against the most 
vulnerable workers”). 
 20 On criminal law as reinforcing race-, class- and other status-based hierarchies, 
see, for example, MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); FRANK DONNER, PROTECTORS OF PRIVILEGE: RED SQUADS 
AND POLICE REPRESSION IN URBAN AMERICA (1990); JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR 
OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017); MARY LOUISE FRAMPTON, IAN 
HANEY LÓPEZ & JONATHAN SIMON, AFTER THE WAR ON CRIME: RACE, DEMOCRACY, AND A 
NEW RECONSTRUCTION (2008); GILMORE, supra note 18; ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE 
WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 
(2016); DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS POLITICS, 
AND THE LIMITS OF LAW (2011); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 
(2007); Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405 
(2018); Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(2019) [hereinafter Abolition Constitutionalism]. 
 21 See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME 
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007) 
[hereinafter GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME] (arguing that criminal law has become the 
dominant governance paradigm); see also GILMORE, supra note 18, at 2 (arguing that 
“criminalization and cages” have become “catchall solutions to social problems”). 
 22 See generally Introduction, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1568 (2019) (describing the 
increasing attention to abolitionist approaches). 
 23 But see supra note 17. 
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heroes, defendants are villains, and prison is the proper tool for dealing 
with Bad Actors.24 
In this Article, I challenge that narrative. By de-exceptionalizing wage 
theft, I examine the limitations of the case for criminalization. Further, 
I take specific aim at the role of incarceration in redressing economic 
injustices, suggesting that the wage theft context reflects the worst 
tendencies of a reflexive turn to prisons as a response to social 
problems. Even if criminal sanctions were appropriate, why is 
incarceration the right response? Despite the insistence from 
proponents of wage theft criminalization that they share the political 
commitments of activists and academics working to reform or dismantle 
the criminal system, their arguments and policy preferences reveal a 
deep and troubling acceptance of the logic of mass incarceration. 
This Article is a piece of a larger project of tracing and critiquing the 
role of the Left and self-described progressives in constructing and 
maintaining the carceral state.25 To that end, my goal here is to examine 
the ways in which arguments grounded in egalitarian and redistributive 
politics ultimately come to support and legitimate deeply inegalitarian 
institutions. Just because the politics of wage theft might (at least at first 
blush) look different from the politics of other areas of criminal law 
does not mean that the lessons learned from decades of tough-on-crime 
politics should be forgotten. While I am sympathetic to the concerns 
and commitments of those calling for criminal enforcement of wage 
theft, I worry that the criminal turn in this context is — at its core — 
indistinguishable from the criminal turn elsewhere. Or, put simply, my 
aim in this Article is to contribute to a small but growing literature that 
argues that the road to mass incarceration is paved at least in part with 
good intentions.26 Reversing course and dialing back the massive 
 
 24 See generally infra Part II. 
 25 See generally Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2173 (2016) 
[hereinafter Guns and Drugs] (critiquing left support of carceral solutions to the 
problem of gun violence); Benjamin Levin, Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor, MINN. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
3542792 [https://perma.cc/F529-UNH7] [hereinafter Imagining the Progressive 
Prosecutor]; Benjamin Levin, Mens Rea Reform and Its Discontents, 109 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 491 (2019) [hereinafter Mens Rea Reform] (critiquing progressive reliance 
on criminal law to deal with politically unpopular defendants); Benjamin Levin, The 
Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 MICH. L. REV. 259 (2018) [hereinafter 
Consensus Myth] (examining the limits of purportedly transformative criminal justice 
critiques and reforms). 
 26 See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 20 (examining the role of left-leaning Black activists 
in supporting tough-on-crime politics); AYA GRUBER, THE FEMINIST WAR ON CRIME 
(2020) (tracing feminist support for carceral policies); JUSTIN MARCEAU, BEYOND CAGES: 
ANIMAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT (2019) (describing the carceral turn in animal 
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apparatus of the carceral state will require checking the punitive 
impulse and turning a critical eye to situations where progressive 
politics embrace regressive ends. 
In examining the punitive politics of wage theft, my argument unfolds 
in four Parts. Part I offers a genealogy of “wage theft” as both a rhetorical 
device and a legal concept. How has wage theft morphed from an 
evocative turn of phrase deployed by activists into a set of distinct laws 
and policies? Critically, how has concern about specific employment 
practices yielded a clarion call for prosecution and incarceration? Next, 
Part II situates discussions of wage theft within a broader literature on 
the purposes of punishment and the potential benefits of 
criminalization. In doing so, I particularly focus on the place of 
incarceration — are calls for wage theft criminalization explicitly and 
exclusively calls for incarcerating bosses who violate the law? If so, what 
is the proffered justification for incarceration, rather than some other 
form of punishment?  
Part III shifts from traditional theories of punishment to a discussion 
of criminalization’s distributive consequences. I see the case for 
criminalization as grounded in the language of distributive justice, so 
here I undertake a distributional analysis of the criminal turn. 
Specifically, I frame pro-criminalization arguments in opposition to the 
growing literature and activist discourse on decarceration and abolition, 
examining why criminalization of wage theft is and might be 
particularly problematic. Finally, Part IV steps back to consider the 
implications of the push for criminal enforcement of wage theft. 
Looking more broadly to other left or progressive criminalization 
efforts, I argue that this case stands as troubling proof of a continued 
affinity for criminal law among those otherwise critical of the criminal 
system. In this respect, I identify wage theft criminalization as 
emblematic of an impulse I describe as “carceral progressivism.” I 
contend that advocates on the left have embraced criminalization not 
only because of pragmatic considerations, but also because of a belief in 
the legitimacy of criminal enforcement as the apotheosis of the 
regulatory state.  
 
rights); NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON AMERICA 
(2014) (outlining the role of liberals in advancing pro-prosecutorial and punitive 
policies during the twentieth century); JUDAH SCHEPT, PROGRESSIVE PUNISHMENT: JOB 
LOSS, JAIL GROWTH, AND THE NEOLIBERAL LOGIC OF CARCERAL EXPANSION (2015) 
(examining the fraught relationship between progressives and jail reform); Kate Levine, 
Police Prosecutions and Punitive Instincts, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) 
[hereinafter Police Prosecutions] (examining support from the left for prosecuting 
police).  
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I. A GENEALOGY OF “WAGE THEFT” 
“Wage theft is not a term without controversy.”27 Despite the 
increasingly ubiquitous use of the phrase, it is generally poorly defined 
(to the extent it is defined at all). And despite its growing place in the 
literature, in activist discourse, and in policy circles, “wage theft” as a 
phrase was unknown until quite recently. Or, perhaps more accurately, 
the idea that bosses were harming workers and depriving them of wages 
was hardly unheard of — this observation lies at the heart of modern 
labor and employment law. (And the notion that the wealthy effectively 
steal from the poor and working class has long been a staple of radical 
left discourse.)28 Rather — and I think importantly — that idea was not 
described as wage theft or treated as theft until very recently. Yet, the 
categorization of “wage theft” has gone largely unexamined, and the 
notion that there is a class of conduct that constitutes “wage theft” is 
frequently treated as a foregone conclusion. This Part provides a brief 
account of the rise of wage theft, tracking its somewhat-amorphous 
definition and its relationship to specific legal claims or policy 
proposals. 
Dating back to the nineteenth century, radical leftists had argued that 
wage labor and the distributions of property constituted theft, or 
something like it. Writing in 1840, French anarchist Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon famously argued that “property is theft!”29 Similarly, Marx 
traced the definition of “theft” to a particular view of private property 
that protected the interests of capital and land owners over those of 
labor and peasants.30 In this account,  
the law itself becomes . . . the instrument of the theft of the 
people’s land . . . . The parliamentary form of the robbery is that 
of Acts for enclosures of Commons, in other words, decrees by 
 
 27 Jennifer J. Lee & Annie Smith, Regulating Wage Theft, 94 WASH. L. REV. 759, 765 
n.18 (2019). 
 28 See PETER LINEBAUGH, STOP, THIEF!: THE COMMONS, ENCLOSURES, AND RESISTANCE 
1-10 (2014); Peter Linebaugh, Karl Marx, the Theft of Wood, and Working Class 
Composition, in CRIME AND CAPITALISM: READINGS IN MARXIST CRIMINOLOGY 76, 76 (David 
F. Greenberg ed., 1981); Ahmed A. White, Capitalism, Social Marginality, and the Rule 
of Law’s Uncertain Fate in Modern Society, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 759, 789 (2005) (describing 
“criminal law’s continued commitment to protecting private property and other key 
institutions of market exchange from violence, theft, and other kinds of disorder”). 
 29 PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY? 13 (Donald R. Kelley & Bonnie G. 
Smith eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1840). 
 30 See KARL MARX, Debates on the Law of Thefts of Wood, reprinted in 1 KARL MARX & 
FREDERICK ENGELS, COLLECTED WORKS 224, 232-33 (Jack Cohen et al. eds., 1975). 
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which the landlords grant themselves the people’s land as 
private property, decrees of expropriation of the people.31  
While radical and Marxist criminologists applying this frame certainly 
identified crimes of capital or the capitalist class, they tended to do so 
in sweeping terms, rejecting the definitions of and approaches to crime 
recognized by the state.32 Their claim was broader than a critique of a 
specific set of employer practices; rather, the argument turned on a 
claim that capitalism and distributions of property rights were 
fundamentally unjust and designed to entrench distributional 
inequality.33 The narrower concept of “wage theft” as a specific practice 
or set of practices has been a much more recent development.  
The first use of “wage theft” in academic literature came in 1988, 
when legal historian Michael Belknap defined the phenomenon as a 
process by which “employers wrongfully [withheld] the pay of their 
employees. Because of the structure of the courts and the cost of hiring 
a lawyer, workers found that as a practical matter there was generally 
no judicial redress for this form of stealing.”34 It was another seventeen 
years before “wage theft” reappeared in the academic lexicon as means 
of describing this phenomenon or set of practices. 
 
 31 Karl Marx, Crime and Primitive Accumulation, in CRIME AND CAPITALISM: READINGS 
IN MARXIST CRIMINOLOGY, supra note 28, at 45, 47. 
 32 See David F. Greenberg, Introduction to CRIME AND CAPITALISM: READINGS IN 
MARXIST CRIMINOLOGY, supra note 28, at 1, 4-8. 
 33 Cf. STUART HALL, Racism and Reaction, in SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS: THE 
GREAT MOVING RIGHT SHOW AND OTHER ESSAYS 142, 151 (Sally Davis et al. eds., 2017) 
(“On the industrial front, it is indeed the law which is recruited directly into 
confrontation with the working class.”); E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE 
ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 265-66 (1975) (making a similar argument regarding game 
laws). 
 34 Michal R. Belknap, From Pound to Harley: The Founding of AJS, 72 JUDICATURE 78, 
82 (1988). 
  
2021] Wage Theft Criminalization 1441 
Figure One. Number of Academic Journal Appearances35 
 
The only other scholarly uses of wage theft prior to its emergence (or 
reemergence) in the mid-2000s reflect an entirely different meaning: 
workers stealing from bosses.36 This theft might take one of two forms 
— the theft of goods by workers as a means of supplementing their 
wages, or the falsification of time records to claim that a worker was 
entitled to more wages that she actually had earned.37 Such a conception 
is consistent with classed framings of theft and property crimes as the 
have-nots stealing from the haves.38 
Judicial opinions reflect a similar pattern, with some lag behind the 
academic literature. The first reference to wage theft in a published 
opinion — in the District of Colorado in 2005 — clearly connotes 
 
 35 These data are drawn from a cross-comparison of searches on Westlaw, JSTOR, 
and Hein last conducted on January 1, 2020. The y-axis represents the number of 
academic articles that include the phrase “wage theft.” 
 36 See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1988); Jason Ditton, Perks, 
Pilferage, and the Fiddle: The Historical Structure of Invisible Wages, 4 THEORY & SOC’Y 
39, 45 (1977); Edward W. Sieh, Garment Workers: Perceptions of Inequity and Employee 
Theft, 27 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 174, 175-76 (1987). 
 37 See generally supra note 36. 
 38 See Marx, supra note 30; cf. DARIO MELOSSI & MASSIMO PAVARINI, THE PRISON AND 
THE FACTORY: ORIGINS OF THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM 72 (1981) (noting that “any theft 
presupposes property rights”). 
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employees stealing from employers.39 That is, “wage theft” describes an 
employee’s fraudulent claim that she was working at times in which she 
was not.40 It wasn’t until 2007 that a judicial opinion used “wage theft” 
to describe an employer’s conduct.41 Even in that opinion, Kreisler v. 
Latino Union, Inc., the court’s description of wage theft stemmed not 
from the nature of the legal claim,42 but from a description of the 
defendant — an organization that operated a legal clinic dedicated to 
“recouping stolen wages from unscrupulous employers” on behalf of 
Latinx workers who had “been denied pay for their work.”43 
Figure Two. Number of Judicial Opinion Appearances44 
 
While some cases use wage theft as a means of describing 
employment abuses,45 most use the phrase only in referring to specific 
 
 39 See Rudd v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of Colo., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 
1201, 1203 (D. Colo. 2005). 
 40 See id. (describing the purpose for an employer’s time-keeping rule as “preventing 
wage theft”). The syllabus of one earlier unpublished case contains a reference to 
employees committing wage theft in this way (i.e., an employee stealing from an 
employer). See Kurincic v. Stein, Inc., 30 F. App’x 420, 423 (6th Cir. 2002). But the 
opinion itself doesn’t describe the conduct in question as “wage theft.” See generally id. 
 41 See Kreisler v. Latino Union, Inc., No. 06-CV-3968, 2007 WL 1118408, at *1-2 
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2007). 
 42 That is, the case itself didn’t involve a claim of wage theft. 
 43 Kreisler, 2007 WL 1118408, at *1. 
 44 These data are drawn from a cross-comparison of searches on Westlaw and Lexis 
last conducted on January 1, 2020. The y-axis tracks the number of judicial opinions 
that use the phrase “wage theft.”  
 45 See Ruqiang Yu v. Holder, 693 F.3d 294, 299 (2d Cir. 2012); Rasmy v. Marriott 
Int’l, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 3d 354, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), vacated, 952 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 
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state statutes that define “wage theft” as a particular class of conduct or 
basis for a particular cause of action.46 Indeed, the rise in the occurrence 
in judicial opinions appears to reflect the rise (and rise in application) 
of state statutes that explicitly define some class of employer conduct as 
“wage theft.”47  
As of 2019, ten states and the federal government statutorily describe 
unlawful employer conduct as “wage theft.”48 That’s not to say that 
other states do not forbid the same conduct or impose similar burdens 
on employers;49 it’s that these states do not statutorily define violations 
as “wage theft.” Under the statutory definitions, wage theft  
includes not only the outright failure to compensate an 
employee, but also the various ways in which employers may 
fail to properly compensate employees, including, for example, 
the failure to: (1) pay the minimum wage or the agreed-upon 
wage; (2) pay time and a half for overtime hours; (3) pay at all 
or for all of the hours worked; (4) pay tips earned; (5) make up 
the difference between the tipped minimum wage and the 
 
2020); Kelley v. Hein, No. 1:17-CV-06636, 2018 WL 4205413, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 
2018); Vercos v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs for Cty. of El Paso, 259 F. Supp. 3d 1169, 1177 
(D. Colo. 2017); Pyara v. Sysco Corp., No. 2:15-cv-01208, 2016 WL 3916339, at *6 
(E.D. Cal. July 20, 2016); Picu v. Bot, No. C14-0330, 2016 WL 2997168, at *2 (W.D. 
Wash. May 24, 2016), amended by 2016 WL 7732967 (W.D. Wash. May 26, 2016); Villa 
Lyan, Inc. v. Perez, 159 So. 3d 940, 941 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); City of Colleyville 
v. Newman, No. 02-15-00017-CV, 2016 WL 1314470, at *1 (Tex. App. Mar. 31, 2016).  
 46 See Hardgers-Powell v. Angels in Your Home LLC, 330 F.R.D. 89, 102 n.5 
(W.D.N.Y. 2019); Johnson v. Winco Foods, LLC, No. ED CV 17-2288, 2018 WL 
6017012, at *19 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2018); Crowe v. Harvey Klinger, Inc., 277 F. Supp. 
3d 182, 189 (D. Mass. 2017); Eren v. Gullouglu LLC, No. 15-CV-4083, 2017 WL 
9482104, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 10, 2017); Strobos v. RxBio, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 3d 221, 
237 (D.D.C. 2017) (describing the Wage Theft Prevention Amendment Act of 2014); 
Bonilla v. Power Design Inc, 201 F. Supp. 3d 60, 64 (D.D.C. 2016); Copper v. Cavalry 
Staffing, LLC, 132 F. Supp. 3d 460, 466 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“In 2010, the New York State 
Legislature passed the Wage Theft Prevention Act . . . in an effort to expand the rights 
of employees to seek civil and criminal avenues of remedy against their employers who 
fail to comply with the labor law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Inclan v. New 
York Hosp. Grp., Inc., 95 F. Supp. 3d 490, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (describing claims under 
the New York Wage Theft Prevention Act). 
 47 See generally sources cited supra note 46 (discussing specific examples of state 
statutes defining “wage theft” and creating causes of action). 
 48 The states are California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, New York, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. 
 49 Indeed, in their comprehensive study of wage theft regulation, Jennifer Lee and 
Annie Smith found that between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2017, twenty-four 
states and fifty-seven localities passed a total of 141 laws designed to address misconduct 
generally identified as wage theft. See Lee & Smith, supra note 27, at 772-73. 
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standard minimum wage when tips do not make up the gap 
between them. Wage theft also includes the failure to properly 
pay workers based upon misclassifying them either as exempt 
from wage and hour laws or as independent contractors.50 
Of course, judicial opinions and statutory text tell only a part of the 
story. The story of wage theft is a story of advocates and activists seeking 
to address a problem and attract public attention.51 Looking at advocacy 
materials reveals a similar pattern of “wage theft” discourse gaining 
ground in the late 2000s and early 2010s. In 2009, the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office published a major report identifying systemic 
violations of wage-and-hour laws as “wage theft.”52 By 2010, the 
National Employment Law Project (“NELP”), one of the nation’s 
leading workers’ rights organizations, had adopted the language of 
“wage theft” to describe employer misconduct.53  
Wage theft needn’t be criminal, and civil penalties often are associated 
with employers’ failure to pay workers.54 In its published reports and 
activism, NELP has often focused on the need to repay workers, ensure 
that whistleblowers were protected, and deter employers55 — goals that 
do not necessarily implicate criminal law. But criminal law has 
frequently been a part of the discussion regarding wage theft and has 
 
 50 Llezlie L. Green, Wage Theft in Lawless Courts, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1303, 1308 
(2019) (citations omitted).  
 51 See BOBO, supra note 10; Lee & Smith, supra note 27, at 765-75. 
 52 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGHLIGHTS OF GAO-09-458T, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR: WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION’S COMPLAINT INTAKE AND INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES 
LEAVE LOW WAGE WORKERS VULNERABLE TO WAGE THEFT (2009), 
http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d09458thigh.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZ8Q-RAQT]. 
 53 See ANNETTE BERNHARDT, DIANA POLSON & JAMES DEFILIPPIS, WORKING WITHOUT 
LAWS: A SURVEY OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR VIOLATIONS IN NEW YORK CITY 6 (Jan. 28, 2010), 
https://www.nelp.org/publication/working-without-laws-a-survey-of-employment-and-
labor-law-violations-in-new-york-city/ [https://perma.cc/TA32-S75S]. 
 54 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 98 (2016); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 115/14 (2014); MD. 
CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-507.2 (2018). 
 55 See, e.g., NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE: CHOOSING THE POLICY 
OPTIONS RIGHT FOR YOUR COMMUNITY (2012), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/WinningWageJusticePolicyOptions.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
TR34-UGCU] (addressing how to create an effective wage theft campaign); NAT’L EMP’T 
LAW PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE: TALKING POINTS ON THE NEED FOR STRONGER ANTI-
WAGE THEFT LAWS, NELP (2012), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ 
WinningWageJusticeTalkingPoints.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NAW-BESK] (discussing the 
widespread problem of wage theft and the ineffectiveness of current wage theft laws); 
NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WORKERS’ WAGE AND HOUR RIGHTS: DON’T BE A VICTIM OF 
WAGE THEFT (2010), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ 
WageAndHourRights2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CXG-5VBX] (referencing how 
employers take advantage of employees by non-payment of wages).  
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frequently been treated as a criminal violation.56 By 2011, for example, 
NELP had begun hailing state efforts to amp up criminal enforcement 
as victories in the fight against wage theft.57 And, by 2013, they were 
tracking and publicizing individual criminal prosecutions.58 Further, of 
the 141 state and local regulations passed between 2005 and 2018 that 
were designed to address wage theft, ten percent allowed for the 
imposition of criminal penalties.59 And in 2014, when then-California 
Labor Commissioner Julie Su sought to promote awareness about the 
problem of wage theft, the campaign she designed had a simple slogan: 
“wage theft is a crime.”60 
Of course, some concept of criminalizing breach of contract, or using 
criminal law to enforce the employment relationship is hardly unheard 
of; its history, though, is an ugly one. In the Jim-Crow-era U.S. South, 
“debt peonage” laws were common.61 Under these laws, a worker who 
promised to provide labor but then failed to could be prosecuted, 
effectively criminalizing the inability to satisfy the terms of an 
employment contract.62 These laws are generally associated with the 
 
 56 See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 105/11 (2019) (stating that employees that 
do not receive proper wages have a right to civil action); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, 
§ 148 (2009) (punishing wage theft with civil citation); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.52 
(2020); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 2 (2020) (allowing for civil action arising from wage theft). 
 57 See NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE: ROUND-UP OF RECENT 
STATE AND LOCAL ACTIVITY TO COMBAT WAGE THEFT (2011), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/WinningWageJusticeStateandLocalLegislativeRoundUp.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4PA2-KSSM]. 
 58 See NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE: A SUMMARY OF CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS OF WAGE THEFT IN THE UNITED STATES (2013), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Crim-Prosecutions-WWJ.pdf [https://perma.cc/84RN-C7NQ]. 
 59 See Lee & Smith, supra note 27, at 772, 780. 
 60 See Stephenie Overman, Waging War on Wage Theft, SALON (Mar. 30, 2019, 6:00 PM), 
https://www.salon.com/2019/03/30/waging-war-on-wage-theft_partner/ [https://perma.cc/ 
Z9WM-3TYF]. 
 61 See generally Tamar R. Birckhead, The New Peonage, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1595, 1677 (2015) (drawing the parallel between peonage in the late nineteenth century 
and the new form that has developed today); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and 
Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era (pt. 2), 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
646, 650 (1982) (describing the continuation of peonage into the twentieth century). 
 62 See, e.g., Donald Braman, Punishment and Accountability: Understanding and 
Reforming Criminal Sanctions in America, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1143, 1175 n.134 (2006) 
(describing the Supreme Court’s choice to strike down laws that effectively maintained 
peonage); Schmidt, supra note 61, at 650 (describing how Black workers who quit jobs 
for which they had contracted could be arrested); cf. ALEX GOUREVITCH, FROM SLAVERY 
TO THE COOPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH: LABOR AND REPUBLICAN LIBERTY IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 30 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2015) (tracing this practice to Roman 
times). 
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Black Codes and other assaults on free Black labor in the years following 
the Civil War.63  
Yet, the activist and academic embrace of the language of wage theft 
over the last decade and a half sounds in a very different discourse — 
the breachers are the bosses, and the punishment isn’t intended to bind 
already marginalized workers; rather, it is to ensure that bosses aren’t 
able to profit unjustly from un- (or under-) compensated laborers.64 
II. A THEORY OF WAGE THEFT CRIMINALIZATION 
As the previous Part showed, defining wage theft as a criminal offense 
is a move that has gained ground over time. While some concern about 
bosses stealing from workers has a long lineage, it is not clear that such 
a critical understanding of employment and wage labor necessitated a 
turn to state violence of a literal redefinition of theft. Yet, over time, 
“wage theft is a crime” and “wage theft is theft” have become frequent 
rallying cries.65 This Part asks why exactly advocates, academics, and 
politicians have adopted this posture. Wage theft may run rampant, be 
morally objectionable, harm workers, and help entrench economic 
inequality, but does that mean it should be criminalized? Or, to the 
extent the conduct already falls under existing criminal statutes, are 
 
 63 See, e.g., DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT 
OF BLACK PEOPLE IN AMERICA FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II, at 7-8 (2008) 
(describing the role of debt peonage in preserving the subordination of Black people); 
PETE DANIEL, THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: DEBT PEONAGE IN THE SOUTH 1901-1969, at 19-20 
(Univ. Ill. Press 1972) (same); CEDRIC J. ROBINSON, BLACK MARXISM: THE MAKING OF THE 
BLACK RADICAL TRADITION 164 (Univ. N.C. Press 2005) (describing various methods 
through which racial oppression continued post-emancipation); David Garland, Penal 
Excess and Surplus Meaning: Public Torture Lynchings in Twentieth-Century America, 39 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 793, 811 (2005) (listing instruments of terror and segregation, 
including debt peonage, used in the South after 1890); Michael J. Klarman, Race and the 
Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 881, 921-27 (1998) (describing coerced 
Black labor in the South); Dorothy E. Roberts, Torture and the Biopolitics of Race, 62 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 229, 246 (2008) (tracing the transition from public racial violence to a 
new system of disenfranchisement, debt peonage, and segregation). 
 64 See infra Part II.A. 
 65 See, e.g., Andy Reid, Palm Beach County Scraps Wage-Theft Law, Sun Sentinel 
(Dec. 4, 2012), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-2012-12-04-fl-wage-theft-
showdown-palm-20121204-story.html [https://perma.cc/YFE5-XRM3] (“Workers 
deserve to get paid [their] wages . . . . Wage theft is theft. The county needs to call it 
that.”); Robert Rodriguez, Thousands in Wages Owed by this Popular Clovis Restaurant, 
Workers Say, FRESNO BEE (Oct. 2, 2018, 12:53 PM), https://www.fresnobee. 
com/news/business/article219336660.html [https://perma.cc/6LSQ-LRP7] (“If they are 
reducing paychecks that is against the law and if they are taking tips that is also against 
the law . . . . Wage theft is a crime.”). 
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prosecution and carceral sentences a fitting or desirable response to the 
problem?  
Workers should be paid for their labor. And bosses should not violate 
employment regulations in ways that harm their workers. In short, wage 
theft is wrong. These strike me as relatively uncontroversial 
statements.66 To the extent that criminalization proponents are making 
those claims, I agree. But that agreement does not get us very far either 
as a theoretical or practical matter. “Wrong” and “criminal” needn’t be 
synonymous. Decades of fiercely punitive politics and ballooning 
criminal codes show us how dangerous it is to elide those two 
concepts.67 Further, recognizing that labor markets are a site of 
tremendous injustice does not necessarily require a turn to criminal law 
and carceral punishment.68  
In the next two Parts, I will address what I take to be a worrisome 
tendency to reflexively equate “wrong” or “socially undesirable” with 
“criminal.” First, in this Part, I will frame the argument in terms of 
 
 66 If they are controversial, any such disagreement raises enormous questions about 
the nature of wage labor, the state, regulation, and markets. 
 67 The insight that “[t]he criminal law cannot encompass all behavior that the 
average citizen may regard as immoral or deviate,” MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. at 
370 (AM. LAW INST. 1980), lies at the heart of decades of literature on 
overcriminalization. See, e.g., DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF 
THE CRIMINAL LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 2008); Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of 
Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. 
REV. 747, 748-49 (2005) (“[T]he term overcriminalization is broad enough to cover 
laws imposing penal sanctions on conduct that should be solely a matter of morality . . . 
[and] relatively trivial conduct.”); Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 
102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 613 (2012) (discussing the rise of laws criminalizing 
immigration and immigrants); Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the 
Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 909 (1961) (describing ballooning 
criminal codes). 
 68 I emphasize “carceral punishment” here (i.e., a jail or prison sentence) because 
advocates for greater criminalization and criminal enforcement of wage theft tend to 
emphasize the importance of these types of punishment. See, e.g., Rob Borkowski, RIAG: 
Cleaning Company Owner Faces Wage Theft Charges, WARWICK POST (July 9, 2020), 
https://warwickpost.com/riag-cleaning-company-owner-faces-wage-theft-charges/ 
[https://perma.cc/4YYH-9N24] (“Attorney General Peter F. Neronha’s office has 
charged a Massachusetts cleaning service owner with wage theft . . . .”); James Thurber, 
Letter to the Editor, Santa Clara County, DA Should Jail Wage Thieves, MERCURY NEWS 
(Dec. 29, 2019, 5:10 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/12/29/letter-santa-
clara-county-and-the-da-should-jail-wage-thieves/ [https://perma.cc/9E85-JWYR] 
(“[H]ere’s hoping that the County of Santa Clara and the District Attorney’s office will 
get the courage to start tossing these thieves in jail.”); Amy Traub, Wage Theft vs. 
Shoplifting: Guess Who Goes to Jail?, DEMOS (June 13, 2017), https://www.demos.org/ 
blog/wage-theft-vs-shoplifting-guess-who-goes-jail [https://perma.cc/D6XE-E5GZ] 
(advocating for criminal penalties for wage theft). 
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“traditional” theories of punishment. For a range of reasons, I am 
hesitant to ascribe too much weight to these theories, which, while 
generally accepted, sound in a discourse of formalism and rationality 
that appears foreign to the actual implementation of criminal law.69 
Nevertheless, they stand as a common language among criminal 
scholars and practitioners, so I think it is important to consider how 
this argument for criminalization maps onto other conventional 
approaches to punishment theory. In Part III, I will analyze the 
criminalization arguments using a distributive or distributional frame, 
focusing on how the turn to prosecutions might be justified by a set of 
structural concerns about distributions of power and resources in 
society. 
A. Retributivism 
From a retributive standpoint, the case for criminalization might rest 
either on the harm done to workers or the moral wrongfulness of the 
theft.70 To the harm-based retributivist, punishment is justified based 
on the harm done and should be scaled accordingly.71 To the fault-based 
retributivist, punishment is based not on harm but on the moral 
culpability or wrongfulness of a person’s actions.72  
 
 69 See, e.g., Michael T. Cahill, Response, Criminal Law’s “Mediating Rules”: 
Balancing, Harmonization, or Accident?, 93 VA. L. REV. 199, 199 (2007) (critiquing the 
“tendency of theoretical work in criminal law . . . to focus on . . . questions about the 
proper justification, scope, and amount of punishment in the abstract, while giving 
significantly less consideration to the various institutional and procedural aspects of 
any concrete system of imposing such punishment”); White, supra note 28, at 786 
(“Conventional accounts of the criminal justice system tend to obscure its social control 
agenda behind the idea that its origins and functions lie with the prevention and 
punishment of crime or even the humanitarian reform of offenders.”). 
 70 Cf. R.A. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community 19-27 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2001) (discussing different approaches to retributivism). 
 71 Sanford H. Kadish, The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 679, 698 (1994); Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Moral 
Character, Motive, and the Psychology of Blame, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 255, 301 (2012); see, 
e.g., Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 523, 566-67 (1993) (describing “harm-based retributivism”). 
 72 See generally Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1745, 1759 n.63 (2012) (describing the role of culpability for “fault-based” 
retributivists); Aya Gruber, A Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1, 16 (2010) [hereinafter A Distributive Theory] (describing “fault-based” 
retributivism); Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 237 (1994) (“Retributivists . . . care about proportioning 
punishment to an offender’s deserts.”); Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict Criminal 
Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1076 (1997) (defining culpability-
based retributivism).  
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The harm-based rationale appears relatively straightforward: 
employers have harmed workers by stealing wages and, therefore, must 
be punished accordingly.73 The harm done in these cases is, 
definitionally financial in nature.74 Wage theft is property crime.75 And 
the property taken is the money a worker is owed (or her 
uncompensated labor, which would net out to the same thing).76 If 
property crime is justified generally — i.e., if the unauthorized taking 
of property is recognized as a harm requiring criminal punishment — 
then wage theft is justified under the same rationale. Indeed, wage theft 
may operate as property crime on a grand scale: according to one 
estimate, minimum wage violations in the United States account for 
over $15 billion in losses annually, an amount greater than all other 
property crime combined.77  
 
 73 See, e.g., Terri Gerstein, Stealing from Workers Is a Crime. Why Don’t More 
Prosecutors See It That Way?, NATION (May 24, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/ 
article/stealing-from-workers-is-a-crime-why-dont-prosecutors-see-it-that-way/ 
[https://perma.cc/32FW-Q8TG] [hereinafter Stealing from Workers Is a Crime] (“[T]he 
harm to the victims of wage theft is real and substantial: People are unable to feed their 
children, pay the rent, buy clothes.”); Hilda L. Solis, Wage Theft Harms All of Us, 
HUFFPOST (July 19, 2016, 9:31 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/wage-theft-
harms-all-of-u_b_7829514 [https://perma.cc/46QE-TDXG] (“This harms all of us. It 
obviously harms the workers . . . .”). 
 74 See Llezlie Green Coleman, Disrupting the Discrimination Narrative: An Argument 
for Wage and Hour Laws’ Inclusion in Antisubordination Advocacy, 14 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 
49, 66 (2018) (describing wage theft as an “economic harm” done to workers); Melinda 
Katz, Opinion, Making the Queens District Attorney a Partner in Justice for Workers, 
GOTHAM GAZETTE (Feb. 7, 2019), http://www.gothamgazette.com/opinion/8259-
making-the-queens-district-attorney-a-partner-in-justice-for-workers [https://perma. 
cc/J8KU-GALQ] (“New York’s workers lose over a billion dollars a year due to wage 
theft, as their hard-earned dollars are illegally stolen and put into the pockets of 
employers . . . .”). That said, some accounts of wage-theft stress that the harm is broader 
and dignitary in nature. See César F. Rosado Marzán, Dignity Takings and Wage Theft, 
92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1211 (2018) [hereinafter Dignity Takings] (“Wage theft may 
thus lead to a dignity taking if employers confiscate workers’ property, such as wages, 
and infantilize or dehumanize them in the process.”). 
 75 See Gerstein, Stealing from Workers Is a Crime, supra note 73 (analogizing wage 
theft to other forms of property crime). 
 76 See generally Elizabeth J. Kennedy, Wage Theft as Public Larceny, 81 BROOK. L. 
REV. 517, 529 (2016) (describing the lost wages of workers); Rita J. Verga, An Advocate’s 
Toolkit: Using Criminal “Theft of Service” Laws to Enforce Workers’ Right to Be Paid, 8 
N.Y.C. L. REV. 283, 285 (2005) (providing background on “theft” laws that require 
stolen “property”). 
 77 See DAVID COOPER & TERESA KROEGER, ECON. POL’Y INST., EMPLOYERS STEAL 
BILLIONS FROM WORKERS’ PAYCHECKS EACH YEAR 288 (2017), 
https://files.epi.org/pdf/125116.pdf [https://perma.cc/KN47-2748]. 
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From a fault-based retributive standpoint, the claim would be that 
taking property (or labor) is morally wrong.78 Again, the extent of this 
argument’s strength rests on a broader vision of how society should 
conceive of property (and labor) rights.  
Notably, while much scholarship and activism regarding wage theft 
focuses on the worker as victim, some commentators also stress the 
state or society as victims.79 Bobo argues that employers who commit 
wage theft — particularly those who commit payroll fraud — have 
stolen “from the public coffers.”80 This theft is not simply an affront to 
the workers in question, but also to “other businesses and citizens” who 
as a result must “pay more than their fair share.”81 Interestingly, this 
argument sounds in a much-older discourse of “crimes against the 
public,” a common justification for conspiracy prosecutions, ostensibly 
victimless crimes, and the criminalization of “vice” crimes.82  
Even assuming one accepts some vision of retributivism as a 
justification for punishment, it is not at all clear to me that retributivism 
requires (or justifies) any sort of carceral punishment for wage theft.83 
The harm done is tangible and seems as though it could be remedied 
 
 78 Cf. BOBO, supra note 10, at 56 (“[The employer] stole wages. He stole workers’ 
health. He stole people’s dignity.”). 
 79 See, e.g., Nicole Hallett, The Problem of Wage Theft, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 
101 (2018) (“[W]age theft has second order effects such as increased spending on social 
programs, like food stamps, and possible adverse public health outcomes.” (footnote 
omitted)); Kennedy, supra note 76, at 522 (“[U]nchallenged wage theft siphons off an 
even greater amount of taxpayer dollars and public trust.”); Todd A. Palo, Minimum 
Wage, Justifiably Unenforced?, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 36, 50-51 (2010) (“[W]age theft 
steals from the public coffers and can affect the national economy.”); Jordan Laris 
Cohen, Note, Democratizing the FLSA Injunction: Toward a Systemic Remedy for Wage 
Theft, 127 YALE L.J. 706, 712 (2018) [hereinafter Democratizing the FLSA Injunction] 
(“Moreover, wage theft harms society at large by increasing workers’ dependency on 
public assistance programs, in effect subsidizing employers who violate the law; 
reducing payroll and tax revenues; decreasing workers’ spending power; and exerting 
downward pressure on wages.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 80 BOBO, supra note 10, at 42-47. 
 81 Id. at 42. 
 82 See, e.g., Guyora Binder, The Rhetoric of Motive and Intent, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
1, 23 (2002) (describing the development of crimes against the public welfare); Santiago 
Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 760, 
766 (2007) (providing background on public order and vice crimes); Erin Murphy, 
Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1479 
(2009) (same). 
 83 Cf. DUFF, supra note 70, at 146-52 (tracking the different justifications offered for 
carceral and financial penalties). 
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with a tangible penalty.84 That is, the actual wage theft cases sound an 
awful lot like tort and breach-of-contract cases, where we already have 
a robust language and legal framework for assigning damages as a way 
of making victims whole.85 Criminal law is not the sole vehicle for 
addressing immoral or harmful conduct.86 And non-criminal 
institutions, more so than criminal ones, foreground the victim and her 
compensation.87 
To the extent that tort or administrative frameworks are inadequate,88 
restorative justice speaks the language of harm and victims’ interests.89 
From institutions rooted in Indigenous approaches to wrongdoing and 
reparations,90 or the radical visions advanced by INCITE!, Survived and 
 
 84 See Matthew Fritz-Mauer, Lofty Laws, Broken Promises: Wage Theft and the 
Degradation of Low-Wage Workers, 20 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 71, 119 (2016) (“I 
personally dislike how criminalizing wage theft frames the problem. Ideally, the primary 
focus of any solution will be on ensuring that workers are made whole for their losses. 
Treating wage theft criminally . . . is likely to emphasize the criminological goals of 
punishment and retribution, rather than compensation for victims.”). 
 85 This vision of tort law sounds in the discourse on corrective justice, or perhaps 
civil-recourse theory. From such a perspective, torts are wrongs, and tort damages are 
a means of addressing those wrongs and compensating plaintiffs for the harm they have 
suffered. See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of 
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1661-62 (1992) (describing a harm-focused, 
corrective-justice-grounded theory of tort law); Benjamin C. Zipursky & John C.P. 
Goldberg, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 946 (2010) (“Tort law provides victims 
with an avenue of civil recourse against those who have committed relational and 
injurious wrongs against them.”). 
 86 Indeed, according to some tort theorists, tort, rather than criminal law is the set 
of rules truly committed to addressing harms because “[c]riminal law sometimes 
prohibits and punishes genuinely inchoate wrongs — uncompleted wrongful acts. Tort 
law does not.” Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 1636 
(2002). 
 87 See Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 
1644 (2019) [hereinafter Envisioning Abolition Democracy] (“An adjunct or alternative 
to criminal punishment, then, is to pursue justice through a civil lawsuit where the 
person wronged seeks to be made whole, taking something from the wrongdoer to 
remove his or her unjust gain and transferring that sum to the victim or survivor of the 
harm.”). 
 88 See id. at 1644-46 (describing shortcomings of a “fault-based approach to civil 
justice” as a replacement for criminal law). 
 89 On the complicated use and misuse of “victims” to describe actors in the criminal 
system, see generally Anna Roberts, Victims, Right?, CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3569623 [https://perma.cc/9WBR-
58AN] [hereinafter Victims, Right?]. 
 90 See, e.g., John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic 
or Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1728 (1999) (“We might do better to follow the 
lead of many Native American peoples who believe in putting the problem rather than 
the person at the center of this deliberation.); Leena Kurki, Restorative and Community 
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Punished, Critical Resistance, and other abolitionist groups, the move 
away from carceral victims’ rights is gaining ground.91 Instead, activists 
have stressed the need for a transformative model rooted in the logic 
and language of reparations.92 If that restorative, transformative, or non-
carceral approach could be used to deal with intimate partner violence 
and police violence, then why couldn’t it be used to deal with economic 
harms? Or, perhaps more importantly, to flip the construction: if — as 
wage theft criminalization proponents suggest — non-carceral 
responses are insufficient to address the harm done by wage theft, then 
how is there any hope that we as a society can move away from carceral 
responses to violent crime? I do not mean to understate the harms done 
by wage theft or the suffering of workers deprived of much needed 
income. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that there might be 
much easier non-criminal solutions to the problem than to violent 
crime and sexual violence, where political support for harsh, carceral 
punishments remains almost insurmountable. (And where devising 
attractive and practicable non-carceral solutions remains a challenge.) 
One certainly might believe that incarceration is the only acceptable 
means of advancing victims’ interests or responding to harm. But, to be 
clear, that belief is fundamentally at odds with any sort of decarceral or 
anti-carceral project. Over half of the currently caged population is 
 
Justice in the United States, 27 CRIME & JUST. 235, 281-82 (2000) (explaining “sentencing 
circles” and their use in the United States); Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community 
Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 359, 377 (2005) (describing jurisdictions’ 
experimentation with healing circles); Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems and 
Tribal Society, 79 JUDICATURE 126 (1995) (describing the holistic philosophy of an 
Indigenous justice system); Angela R. Riley, Crime and Governance in Indian Country, 
63 UCLA L. REV. 1564 (2016) (describing tribal courts as potential sites of 
experimentation and places of departure from the U.S. model of criminal adjudication 
and punishment).  
 91 See LEIGH GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A BALANCED POLICY 
APPROACH TO INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 5 (Univ. Cal. Press 2018); Gruber, supra note 
26, at 15-18; Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: 
Thinking Intersectionally About Women, Race, and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418, 
1421-24 (2012); Andrea James, Ending the Incarceration of Women and Girls, 128 YALE 
L.J.F. 772, 787 (2019); Kelly Hayes & Mariame Kaba, The Sentencing of Larry Nassar 
Was Not ‘Transformative Justice.’ Here’s Why., APPEAL (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://theappeal.org/the-sentencing-of-larry-nassar-was-not-transformative-justice-
here-s-why-a2ea323a6645/ [https://perma.cc/D8P2-3Y2N]. 
 92 See Mariame Kaba & Andrea J. Ritchie, We Want More Justice for Breonna Taylor 
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being held for “violent crime.”93 While “violent crime” may be the 
“third rail” of criminal justice politics,94 scholars and reformers 
increasingly view addressing violence as essential to a truly decarceral 
reform agenda.95 If we dismiss out-of-hand the decarceration of people 
convicted of crimes of violence or crimes where another person has 
been harmed, then we necessarily accept a massive carceral population. 
Embracing carceral solutions to wage theft while asserting a continued 
support for “criminal justice reform” and opposition to “mass 
incarceration,” then, entails both a narrow vision of reform and of mass 
incarceration.96 
Some workers’ rights advocates and wage-theft criminalization 
proponents might argue that the injury done to workers is not merely 
economic in nature. By stealing workers’ labor, bosses inflict a major 
dignitary harm or in some way violate a worker’s autonomy, freedom, 
liberty, or sense of self.97 The harm of slavery or of indentured servitude 
certainly transcends what the law and legal scholars usually mean when 
they speak of “property crime” or “economic damages.” To the extent 
work and the ability to sell one’s labor are critical components of 
society, then unfree labor tears at the fabric of individual freedom and 
social relationships.98 
 
 93 See Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, 
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/ 
pie2019.html [https://perma.cc/92GS-Q4UH]. It is worth noting, though, that “violent 
crime” remains a term of art, and what exactly constitutes “violence” is a question 
debated by judges, legislators, and academics. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 576 
U.S. 591 (2015) (debating the nature of “violent crime”); Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law 
in the Shadow of Violence, 62 ALA. L. REV. 571 (2011) (explaining the complexities of 
“violent crime”). 
 94 JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO 
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 185 (2017). 
 95 See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 20, at 229-30; MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE 
PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 165-69 (Princeton Univ. Press 
2014) (critiquing reform efforts focused exclusively on non-violent crime); PFAFF, supra 
note 94, at 23 (“[T]he rhetoric and tactics used to push through reforms for lower-level 
offenses often explicitly involve imposing even harsher punishments on those convicted 
of violent crimes.”). 
 96 See generally Levin, Consensus Myth, supra note 25 (describing and critiquing this 
narrow conception).  
 97 See generally Marzán, Dignity Takings, supra note 74 (discussing wage theft’s 
dignitary harms).  
 98 See William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 
19 (1999); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for 
Affirmative Action and Reparations, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 683, 685, 699 (2004); see also 
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in 
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I think that argument is fair as far as it goes, but it is effectively 
unlimited in application. Wage theft is hardly the only area where the 
surface-level harm belies a range of deeper consequences.99 If we look 
carefully, much conduct often dismissed as “victimless” does, or at least 
leads to, harm.100 That expansive conception of harm is frequently 
offered as a justification for criminalizing a range of drug crimes, 
pornography-related offenses, and so-called “public order” offenses.101 
While these crimes are often critiqued as “victimless” or examples of 
overcriminalization, an expansive conception of harm might tie each to 
troubling real-world consequences (drug overdose, gender-based 
violence, etc.).102 Further, in recognizing those additional or collateral 
harms in the wage theft context begs the question of whether we might 
view all property crime through a similar lens.  
A fault-based approach should raise similar concerns for critics of the 
carceral state. Simply concluding that conduct (here, wage theft) is 
“bad” or “wrong” needn’t mean concluding that such conduct should 
be criminalized or should lead to people being held in cages. So, a fault-
based argument for caging bosses who steal wages must rest on some 
view that their conduct is worse than another class of conduct that is 
morally reprehensible but not bad enough to trigger carceral 
sanctions.103 Again, this analysis raises a question of how deep one’s 
decarceral commitments are. Arguing that wage thieves must be 
incarcerated seems to raise problems for those committed to 
decarceration for violent crime, sex crimes, and other conduct that 
generally is viewed as extremely bad (or for defendants who are 
extremely politically unpopular). As I have argued elsewhere,104 this 
line of reasoning provides a difficult test for progressives and those on 
the political left — is their commitment to abolition, decarceration, or 
 
America, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 309 (2003); Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor 
Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 447 (1989). 
 99 See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1999) (arguing that that even ostensibly victimless crimes can cause 
harm). 
 100 See id. at 110-12.  
 101 See id. at 110-13, 153.  
 102 See id. at 109-15.  
 103 One certainly might believe that all immoral behavior should be criminalized and 
that all people who behave immorally should be incarcerated. But that would be an 
extremely radical position to take and would be dramatically at odds with both 
contemporary scholarly views and the political positions otherwise associated with the 
left, the center left, and the progressive spaces that wage theft criminalization 
proponents inhabit. 
 104 See generally Levin, Mens Rea Reform, supra note 25. 
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sweeping reform; or do they remain committed to incarceration as the 
tool for addressing conduct they view as bad or socially undesirable? If 
the former, then the carceral turn here is cause for concern. If the latter, 
then the carceral state looks like it is here to stay.  
B. Deterrence 
Many wage theft criminalization proponents frame their arguments 
in terms of deterrence.105 Employers have significant financial 
incentives to cheat and steal from their workers. And, given the relative 
lack of power exerted by workers (particularly in non-unionized sectors 
and shops), employers have little to fear from workers by way of 
reprisal. This dynamic is perhaps most dramatic and disturbing in 
sectors largely staffed by immigrant labor.106 Because of the framework 
 
 105 See, e.g., Anna Boiko-Weyraugh, Wage Theft Rampant in Colorado, DURANGO 
HERALD (Jan. 23, 2015, 10:52 AM), https://durangoherald.com/articles/85275 
[https://perma.cc/4JCS-NV3A] (quoting an employment law attorney as arguing that 
“increased criminal enforcement of the wage laws would provide significant deterrent 
effects”); Gus Bova, ‘Landmark’ Wage Theft Conviction Overturned by Texas Appeals 
Court, TEX. OBSERVER (Sept. 6, 2018, 6:38 AM), https://www.texasobserver.org/ 
landmark-wage-theft-conviction-overturned-by-texas-appeals-court/ [https://perma.cc/ 
FJA7-2XMR] (“Convicting the worst wage thieves is supposed to act as a deterrent . . . 
.”); Luis Ferré-Sadurní, New York Officials Battle Wage Theft in Construction Industry, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/06/nyregion/new-york-
construction-wage-theft.html [https://perma.cc/CM8Q-B7DS] (“The $2.5 million in 
unpaid wages announced by prosecutors may seem insignificant compared to the 
estimated $1 billion in lost wages that affect tens of thousands of workers in New York 
each year. But officials and worker advocates say the cases may deter employers from 
conducting such wage violations in the future.”); Melissa Sanchez & Matt Kiefer, Wage 
Theft Victims Have Little Chance of Recouping Pay in Illinois, CHI. REP. (Aug. 9, 2017), 
https://www.chicagoreporter.com/wage-theft-victims-have-little-chance-of-recouping-
pay-in-illinois/ [https://perma.cc/CLF9-9VNF] (“One of the most celebrated aspects of 
the reforms elevated repeat offenses to felonies, a change that advocates hoped would 
be a deterrent.”). 
 106 See, e.g., Llezlie Green Coleman, Rendered Invisible: African American Low-Wage 
Workers and the Workplace Exploitation Paradigm, 60 HOW. L.J. 61, 63 (2016) 
(describing “the particular vulnerability of our immigrant population and the resulting 
high levels of wage theft and other workplace exploitation in the immigrant 
community”); Lee, supra note 13, at 656 (describing the problem of wage-theft in 
industries with a largely immigrant workforce); Deborah M. Weissman, Jacqueline 
Hagan, Ricardo Martinez Schuldt & Alyssa Peavey, The Politics of Immigrant Rights: 
Between Political Geography and Transnational Interventions, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 117, 
168-69 (discussing the vulnerability of farmworkers); NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, 
WORKPLACE VIOLATIONS, IMMIGRATION STATUS, AND GENDER: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM 
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of immigration law and its interaction with labor and employment laws, 
workers have good reason to fear retaliation from employers if they 
report abuses (and also may have good reason to fear that reporting 
abuses might expose them to negative immigration consequences at the 
hands of state actors).107 Even outside of shops where immigrant 
workers predominate, the general impotence of legal protections for 
workers means that there is little formal counterbalance to the financial 
benefits an employer enjoys by underpaying her workers.108 Indeed, one 
scholar has gone so far as to observe that procedural rules that impede 
class actions effectively “facilitate[] wage theft.”109 To the extent that a 
fair and just market economy requires effective counterweights to the 
profit motive,110 the civil and administrative institutions that provide 
such a counterweight have failed. 
Criminal prosecution, the argument goes, provides that 
counterbalance.111 And not just prosecution. Fines, for many 
criminalization proponents, do not go far enough to change employers’ 
cost-benefit analysis.112 Instead, incarceration is necessary to counteract 
 
 107 See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) 
(denying backpay to an undocumented worker who had been laid off for participating 
in protected labor organizing activity). See generally Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest 
Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1879, 1907-08 (2007) (describing 
Hoffman Plastic’s consequences for “unauthorized workers”); Cynthia L. Estlund, The 
Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1564 (2002) [hereinafter 
Ossification] (stating that Hoffman Plastic targets the ability to vindicate the rights of a 
“vulnerable” segment of the labor market); Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in 
the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 345, 348 (2001) (“Recent decisions . . . show[] that labor law’s promise of 
meaningful protection from exploitation in the workplace remains illusory.”). 
 108 See Estlund, Ossification, supra note 107, at 1564 (lamenting the declining 
efficacy of labor law in vindicating workers’ rights); Luke P. Norris, Labor and the 
Origins of Civil Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 462, 463 (2017) (cataloguing procedural 
hurdles); Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are Using 
Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 
1356 (2015). 
 109 Ruan, supra note 8, at 728-30. 
 110 See, e.g., Gillian Lester, Careers and Contingency, 51 STAN. L. REV. 73, 124 (1998) 
(“[I]f a worker’s choices are constrained because of a boss who exerts oppressive control 
in order to maximize profits, then the solution may be labor market regulations that 
require safety precautions, unemployment insurance funded by taxes on employers, or 
payment of a minimum wage.”). 
 111 See sources cited supra note 105. 
 112 See, e.g., Terri Gerstein, Opinion, More States Should Follow New Colorado Policy 
on Wage Theft, HILL (May 30, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/ 
446199-more-states-should-follow-new-colorado-policy-on-wage-theft [https://perma.cc/ 
CD3K-NGQS] [hereinafter More States Should Follow New Colorado Policy] (“Our laws 
too often treat employer crimes with a light touch, levying only minimal penalties 
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employers’ incentives to steal. This argument reflects a common claim 
advanced by deterrence theorists: if law breaking is common, and the 
odds of getting caught are quite low, then the punishment must be high 
enough to scare defendants and keep them from breaking the law.113 
According to commentators, wage theft is rampant and enforcement is 
shoddy at best.114 So, to the deterrence proponent, the punishment must 
be very harsh in order for the law to stop greedy employers. 
Deterrence theory, though, occupies a peculiar place in the literature 
on criminal punishment. On the one hand, deterrence is recognized as 
the primary justification for many criminal laws and much 
enforcement.115 On the other hand, decades of studies have failed to 
provide strong empirical support for the deterrent effect of 
criminalization and incarceration.116 Deterrence arguments tend to 
display a “characteristic empirical speculativeness.”117 Or, as criminal 
law theorist Alice Ristroph puts it, “[d]eterrence is simply too 
indeterminate to be of use.”118 
From a deterrence standpoint, the question remains why criminal law 
(and, specifically, incarceration) is necessary and why civil penalties are 
 
amounting to little more than a slap on the wrist. The new [criminal] law in Colorado 
appropriately treats wage theft with the seriousness it deserves.”); Amy Traub, Wage 
Theft and Shoplifting: Same Cost, Different Deterrents, AM. PROSPECT (June 23, 2017), 
https://prospect.org/article/wage-theft-and-shoplifting-same-cost-different-deterrents 
[https://perma.cc/3GP3-5X4L] (asserting that “[t]he fines imposed by the federal Fair 
Labor Standards Act often amount to a slap on the wrist; they’re too weak to act as an 
effective deterrent” and that prosecution is appropriate). 
 113 See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169, 184 (1968) (articulating this theory in the context of criminal law); A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. 
L. REV. 869, 890 (1998) (articulating this theory). 
 114 See, e.g., Elizabeth Wilkins, Silent Workers, Disappearing Rights: Confidential 
Settlements and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 109, 111 
(2013) (describing the “wage theft epidemic”); Cohen, Democratizing the FLSA 
Injunction, supra note 79, at 711-12 (stating that “workers lose an estimated $15 billion 
annually”). 
 115 See CESARE BECCARIA, On Crimes and Punishments, in ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 
AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 21 (Richard Bellamy ed., Richard Davies & Virginia Cox trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1764). 
 116 See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING 
THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 4-7 (Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline 
Cohen & Daniel Nagin eds., 1978) (describing uncertain results of studies on 
deterrence); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 
416 (1999) (“Deterrence arguments also draw incessant fire from academic theorists. 
Empirically, deterrence claims are speculative.”). 
 117 Kahan, supra note 116, at 430. 
 118 Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1350 n.227 (2006). 
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insufficient to address wage theft.119 Criminal law unquestionably 
imposes substantial social costs.120 So, how could we justify adopting 
such a costly regulatory approach? Scholars tend to offer two 
justifications. First, financial damages may be difficult to collect — 
defendants may be judgement-proof, and procedural hurdles might 
make it extremely time-consuming or costly to enforce a judgement.121 
In the wage-theft context, where many defendants are contractors, 
smaller construction businesses, or restaurant owners, the specter of a 
judgment going unpaid looms large.122 Second, even assuming that a 
defendant can and does pay, the civil penalty may not be great enough 
— it may be viewed as a “cost of doing business,” rather than a message 
 
 119 It is worth noting that these regulatory decisions operate against a background 
set of rules and cultural norms that increasingly have veered away from governmental 
regulation altogether, instead embracing “self-regulatory” approaches. See, e.g., Cynthia 
Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 319, 321 (2005) (“Self-regulation resonates with rather old ideas in workplace 
governance.”). See generally Timothy P. Glynn, Taking Self-Regulation Seriously: High-
Ranking Officer Sanctions for Work-Law Violations, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 279, 
282 n.5 (2011) (collecting sources). 
 120 I address these costs at length infra Part III. See also John Bronsteen, Christopher 
Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 
1038-39 (2009); Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and 
Incarceration: An Economic Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property Law, 87 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 275, 284 (2014) (“Incarceration generates very substantial economic costs, costs 
that are imposed upon the prisoner, his friends and family, and the government that is 
charged with imprisoning him.”).  
 121 See, e.g., Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 120, at 284-85 (“[T]he economic 
justification for criminal law lies with the possibility that defendants will be insolvent 
or otherwise unable to satisfy a civil judgment.”); Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal 
Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 
950 (2007) (“The problem of monetary victories not translating into cash in hand has 
occurred in the context of the labor movement, in which judicial findings of violations 
of workers’ rights have proven inconsequential to the plaintiffs due to companies’ 
abilities to resist remedial payments.”); cf. Douglas Husak, The Price of Criminal Law 
Skepticism: Ten Functions of the Criminal Law, 23 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 27, 38-39 (2020) 
[hereinafter The Price of Criminal Law Skepticism] (discussing the interplay of criminal 
law and insurance markets in ensuring that victims are compensated). 
 122 See Andrew Elmore, Collaborative Enforcement, 10 NE. U. L. REV. 72, 75-76 n.4 
(2018) (“Employers in small, low-wage workplaces are often judgment proof and more 
likely to respond to notice of enforcement by closing and reopening under a new name, 
or by disappearing altogether.”); Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor 
Standards Enforcement Through Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & 
SOC’Y 552, 555 (2010) (showing that sectors “at greatest risk of FLSA violations are 
overwhelmingly composed of establishments of fewer than twenty employees”); Brishen 
Rogers, Justice at Work: Minimum Wage Laws and Social Equality, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1543, 
1560 n.93 (2014) (collecting sources). 
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that the punished conduct is unacceptable.123 That is, in the wage-theft 
context, an employer might conclude that the chances of evading 
punishment (or perhaps the financial advantages of paying wages at a 
later date) outweigh the costs of a potential fine. Particularly if the 
amount of the fine or judgment is the same as the amount owed, then 
the employer is no worse off.124 
A deterrence-based justification for criminalization and carceral 
punishment rests on two further assumptions: (a) that employers are 
rational actors, susceptible to social engineering in their decision-
making, such that they can be deterred from committing acts of wage 
theft; and (b) that prison or jail sentences are an effective way to prevent 
employers from stealing wages. These are assumptions, not facts.125 And, 
given the tremendous costs associated with incarceration, we should try 
to determine whether these assumptions are accurate before accepting 
that deterrence justifies carceral responses to wage theft.126 I do not 
purport to provide conclusive answers here — these are massive 
questions that have long troubled criminal law scholarship and 
policymaking.127 But, by highlighting that both claims are contentious 
 
 123 See Alec Karakatsanis, The Punishment Bureaucracy: How to Think About “Criminal 
Justice Reform,” 128 YALE L.J.F. 848, 886 (2019) (“[C]orporations engage in wage theft 
and view the occasional civil lawsuit forcing compensation for these crimes as a cost of 
doing business.”); Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31, 80 (2017) (“To a well-
heeled financial institution . . . a civil crackdown is a ‘cost of doing business,’ whereas 
a criminal crackdown means jail time for employees . . . .”); Noah D. Zatz, Working 
Beyond the Reach or Grasp of Employment Law, in THE GLOVES-OFF ECONOMY: WORKPLACE 
STANDARDS AT THE BOTTOM OF THE LABOR MARKET 31, 43 (Annette Bernhardt et al. eds., 
2008) (describing this view as prevalent among employers); Sam Dolnick, Workers’ 
Safeguards Strengthened by N.Y. Law, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/14/nyregion/14wage.html [https://perma.cc/6FDP-
MUF] (quoting a New York State Senator as observing that under a previous 
employment regulation “[t]he fines were so minimal that a lot of these rogue employers 
saw them as the cost of doing business”). 
 124 Such an analysis of course disregards or discounts other non-monetary costs — 
e.g., reputational harm, decreasing worker morale, etc. 
 125 Cf. JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983) 
(arguing that assumptions, masquerading as truths, underlie much legal analysis); 
Benjamin Levin, Response, Values and Assumptions in Criminal Adjudication, 129 HARV. 
L. REV. F. 379 (2016) (same). 
 126 Cf. Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence 
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing 
New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 308 (1998) (“Claims of deterrence are, of course, 
empirical in nature.”).  
 127 See Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE 
L.J. 263, 317 & n.234 (2005) (collecting sources). 
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at best, I mean to emphasize just how shaky the foundation for a 
deterrence-based carceral approach to wage theft is. 
First, deterrence arguments are at their core rooted in an economistic 
understanding of both crime and human decision-making.128 People 
(according to such an account) know the law, understand law 
enforcement, and make decisions based on that information. Decades 
of scholarship, though, reveal that public ignorance of criminal law is 
quite common.129 If criminal law is to have some sort of deterrent effect, 
potential law-breakers must be aware of the law, and, more importantly 
here, must be aware of successful enforcement.130 Once aware of the 
law, the likelihood of prosecution, etc., the employer would have to 
weigh those costs against the benefits of committing wage theft.  
I will return to the issue of knowledge/notice in my discussion of 
expressive theories, but one point about the identity of wage theft 
defendants merits mention here: much rhetoric surrounding wage theft 
criminalization speaks of large, powerful bosses. At the same time, 
though, many of the sectors where wage theft is rampant are dominated 
by small (often immigrant- and minority-owned) businesses.131 There 
might be good reason to think that a large, multi-national corporate 
entity is capable of and effective at “knowing the law” and then 
performing a cost-benefit analysis.132 But what about individuals, small, 
closely-held corporations, or businesses run by un-savvy actors? For a 
deterrence rationale to justify wage theft, we would have to believe that 
Walmart and the corner deli operate the same way and are similarly 
situated when it comes to approaching their relationship to workers, 
law, and law enforcement.133 
Second, even if these assumptions about cost-benefit analysis and 
compliance were correct, are criminal law and carceral penalties 
effective at deterring undesirable conduct? Much ink has been spilled 
 
 128 See Gordon Tullock, Does Punishment Deter Crime?, 36 PUB. INT. 103, 104-05 
(1974). 
 129 See infra Part II.E. 
 130 See infra Part II.E. 
 131 See infra Part III.B.1. 
 132 See Levin, Mens Rea Reform, supra note 25, at 514-15. 
 133 Cf. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975) (“The requirements of 
foresight and vigilance imposed on responsible corporate agents are beyond question 
demanding, and perhaps onerous, but they are no more stringent than the public has a 
right to expect of those who voluntarily assume positions of authority in business 
enterprises whose services and products affect the health and well-being of the public 
that supports them.”). 
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on this question, and the research is inconclusive at best.134 Numerous 
studies across a range of areas have shown the failure of prosecution as 
a deterrent mechanism.135 Or, at the very least, that the marginal 
deterrent effect frequently is outweighed by countervailing costs.136 
Indeed, in her sweeping study of corporate crime (generally presumed 
to be an area where criminal law’s deterrent effect might be greater), 
criminologist Sally Simpson found that the “apparent shift toward 
criminalization and deterrence” as regulatory strategies “may, in fact, be 
socially harmful.”137  
Other studies have been more optimistic about the ability of criminal 
law to do some deterrent work. To the extent those studies find that 
deterrence “works,” the key takeaway is that swiftness and certainty of 
punishment, rather than severity, are the key ingredients to optimal 
deterrence via criminal law.138 Some of those studies also indicate that 
 
 134 See Jason Scott Johnston, Not So Cold an Eye: Richard Posner’s Pragmatism, 44 
VAND. L. REV. 741, 756 (1991) (book review) (“The empirical evidence on law’s 
deterrent effect is at best mixed.”). 
 135 See, e.g., Nonimmigrant Visa Issues: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
104th Cong. 94, 105-06 (1995) (testimony of Bob L. Vice, President, California Farm 
Bureau Federation, and John Young) (discussing the failure of prosecution as a 
deterrent in the context of employment of undocumented workers); Kim Shayo 
Buchanan, When Is HIV a Crime? Sexuality, Gender and Consent, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1231, 
1234 (2015) (discussing the failure of prosecution as a deterrent in the context of HIV 
transmission); Margaret B. Kwoka, Leaking and Legitimacy, 48 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1387, 
1415 (2015) (discussing the failure of prosecution as a deterrent in the context of 
government leaking).  
 136 See, e.g., Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The 
Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 211, 273 (2012) (“[M]anipulating liability and punishment rules within 
[the criminal] system will work only in . . . atypical cases . . . .”); Kwoka, supra note 
135, at 1418 (“[S]ocial science literature demonstrates that imposing criminal penalties 
as a method for deterring undesirable behavior is widely regarded as a relatively 
inefficient and ineffective way to achieve social order.”); Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal 
Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 1-37 
(1998) (“[I]t is difficult to generalize from the findings of a specific study because 
knowledge about the factors that affect the efficacy of policy is so limited.”). 
 137 SALLY S. SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 161 (Alfred 
Blumstein & David Farrington eds., 2002). 
 138 See, e.g., VALERIE WRIGHT, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: EVALUATING CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT 4-5 (2010), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Deterrence-in-Criminal-
Justice.pdf [https://perma.cc/QP2B-BHQU] (collecting sources). 
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white-collar crime might be a better target for deterrence-based 
approaches than other areas involving less-savvy defendants.139  
Just as we do not know conclusively whether deterrence works as a 
general matter, there is not a broad scholarly consensus about whether 
prosecuting bosses would work to deter wage theft. The little evidence 
that we do have seems to suggest that criminal (rather than civil) wage 
theft enforcement actions have not been associated with reduced 
violation rates.140 Put simply, even if criminal law works to deter other 
bad conduct, there is no factual basis to conclude that it actually 
discourages bosses from violating wage-and-hour laws. There is some 
empirical support for the claim that large monetary penalties (e.g., 
treble damages) might deter employers,141 but no evidence about the 
value of incarceration.  
While it undoubtedly is significant that we lack an empirical 
foundation for the claim that prison sentences will prevent wage theft, 
I do not want to overstate the importance of incarceration’s (in)efficacy. 
Even if new studies showed some deterrent effect, a deterrence 
argument for wage theft criminalization should trouble anyone 
concerned about the carceral state. By embracing an argument that 
caging people is an acceptable approach if it deters bad conduct, 
workers’ rights advocates have accepted and embraced a core 
component of our harshly punitive system.  
If caging a person were justified whenever it deters bad conduct, then 
we wind up with a deeply carceral approach. Even is incarceration 
“works” in some narrow sense, does that mean it is good policy? As 
discussed in the context of retributive justifications, perhaps there is 
some limiting principle based on what constitutes truly bad conduct.142 
But drawing that line is difficult,143 and identifying property crime as an 
obvious candidate for caging sets a dangerous precedent. It concedes 
that — in the larger consequentialist analysis — a great deal of suffering 
and a great deal of state violence are acceptable solutions to social 
 
 139 Again, I think it’s fair to ask whether the “white collar” characterization is helpful 
as an ordering mechanism and whether wage theft defendants truly are utility-
maximizing rational actors. See infra Part III.B. 
 140 See Daniel J. Galvin, Deterring Wage Theft: Alt-Labor, State Politics, and the Policy 
Determinants of Minimum Wage Compliance, 14 PERSP. ON POL. 324, 339 (2016); Lee & 
Smith, supra note 27, at 793-94.  
 141 See Galvin, supra note 140, at 339. But see Lee & Smith, supra note 27, at 793-94 
(expressing skepticism about deterrence resulting from increasing penalties). 
 142 See supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text. 
 143 Cf. generally Alice Ristroph, Farewell to the Felonry, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
563 (2018) [hereinafter Farewell to the Felonry] (critiquing the naturalization of 
distinctions between classes of crime). 
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problems.144 Or, put differently, to the extent that these justifications 
rest on a consequentialist analysis, this line of reasoning accepts the 
benefits uncritically while largely disregarding the costs.  
C. Incapacitation 
It would not be a stretch to argue that — of the traditional 
justifications for punishment — incapacitation operates as the driving 
theory of contemporary carceral policies.145 Therefore, it is hardly 
surprising that incapacitation is an easy way to justify any endorsement 
of incarceration. (Incapacitation is, after all, the defining feature of 
incarceration.) The wage theft context is no exception. Much of the 
literature and activism surrounding the crisis of wage theft speaks of 
bad employers who pose a danger to workers.146 So, the move to argue 
for criminalization, prosecution, and incarceration can be understood 
as a claim that these employers should be “taken out of commission” — 
that they must be kept of out of the market, where their greed and 
callousness poses a threat to workers and the morality of the 
marketplace. If we conceive of workers’ rights as a matter of public 
safety, then an employer who has proven herself willing to prioritize 
profit over worker safety, compliance with regulations, or fair 
compensation is a threat to public safety.147 There may be other ways to 
shape or influence the employer’s conduct, but — the argument goes — 
 
 144 See infra Part III.B.2. 
 145 Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189, 196 (2013); see 
Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging 
Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 457-58 (1992). 
 146 See, e.g., Rebecca Galemba, Opinion, Criminalizing Wage Theft Is Only One Step 
in the Right Direction, COLO. SUN (Apr. 29, 2019, 4:05 AM), 
https://coloradosun.com/2019/04/29/wage-theft-colorado-bill-law/ [https://perma.cc/ 
JUN9-A6A3] (“Employers string workers along who lack the time and resources to 
spend a day pursuing unpaid wages . . . .”); Office of Attorney Gen. Maura Healey, AG 
Healey Assesses More than $2.7 Million in Penalties and Restitution Against Construction 
Companies in 2018, MASS.GOV (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.mass.gov/news/ag-healey-
assesses-more-than-27-million-in-penalties-and-restitution-against-construction 
[https://perma.cc/9R7Z-FK6G] (“Workers in the construction industry are particularly 
vulnerable to wage theft from dishonest contractors who cheat their workers.”); News 
Release, Cal. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, DIR, Labor Commissioner Launch Online 
System for Reporting Labor Law Violations (Aug. 31, 2016), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20161028151844/https://www.dir.ca.gov/DIRNews/2016/
2016-84.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8AN-CSW3] (“Wage theft and workplace abuse not 
only hurt workers, they also undermine the safety and stability of communities as they 
reduce revenues and create an uneven playing field for law-abiding employers.”).  
 147 This argument, of course, accepts a specific and narrow understanding of “public 
safety” — it disregards the safety of incarcerated people. 
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incarceration provides the surest guarantee that she will not reoffend or 
continue to harm other workers.148 
If we understand incapacitation as the dominant theory for decades 
of punitive policies,149 though, then it is not hard to see why an appeal 
to incapacitation should be troubling for those concerned about mass 
incarceration. Whether the rationale is the financial costs of 
incarceration,150 the indignities of prison life,151 or the distributive 
consequences of the carceral turn,152 more and more commentators 
appear to be rejecting a reflexive embrace of the incapacitationist 
logic.153 The idea that society’s problems can be solved by putting more 
people in prison is (at least in many circles) falling into disfavor. And a 
growing body of literature highlights the ways in which “incapacitation” 
is not merely a theoretical project, or a sterile process of social 
exclusion. Rather, incapacitation implicates caging, or hyper-
surveillance — techniques that do significant physical and 
psychological harm.154 
 
 148 This analysis, of course, would differ for corporate defendants. See generally W. 
Robert Thomas, Incapacitating Criminal Corporations, 72 VAND. L. REV. 905 (2019) 
(examining the role of incapacitation in addressing corporate misfeasance). 
 149 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 150 See, e.g., Mirko Bagaric, From Arbitrariness to Coherency in Sentencing: Reducing 
the Rate of Imprisonment and Crime While Saving Billions of Taxpayer Dollars, 19 MICH. 
J. RACE & L. 349 (2014); Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. 
L. REV. 1103, 1103 (2013) (“Driven by a number of factors, not the least of which is the 
enormous human and financial cost of mass incarceration, policy makers are now 
shrinking prison and jail populations and pursuing cheaper non-brick-and-mortar 
social control options.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 151 See Levin, Consensus Myth, supra note 25, at 270-72. 
 152 See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 20, at 140 (“[J]udges, prosecutors, and defense 
attorneys may not even be aware of the full range of collateral consequences for a felony 
conviction.”); WESTERN, supra note 20, at 35 (tracing the relationship between race, 
criminalization, and economic inequality); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral 
Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1274 
(2004) (“The first feature of mass incarceration is simply the sheer numbers of African 
Americans behind bars.”). 
 153 See Levin, Consensus Myth, supra note 25, at 287-88 (describing these competing 
rationales). 
 154 See, e.g., KERAMET REITER, 23/7: PELICAN BAY PRISON AND THE RISE OF LONG-TERM 
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT (2016) (discussing how the redefinition of solitary confinement 
led to normalizing “a practice condemned as torture by international human rights 
bodies”); JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A REMARKABLE COURT 
DECISION AND THE FUTURE OF PRISONS IN AMERICA 4 (2014) (“[T]he conditions existing 
in U.S. prisons today are fundamentally, irreparably inhumane.”); Mika’il DeVeaux, The 
Trauma of the Incarceration Experience, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 257, 275 (2013) 
(“[T]he conditions imposed within the prison environment . . . are meant to break those 
entering the system.”); Sharon Dolovich, Strategic Segregation in the Modern Prison, 48 
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Assuming that — after decades of mass incarceration — prison no 
longer receives the benefit of the doubt as the solution to social 
problems, why should it in the context of wage theft? I don’t know. I 
take most arguments for wage theft criminalization and the 
incarceration of abusive bosses as having failed to internalize the diverse 
critiques that have shaped our current moment of carceral 
skepticism.155 If incarceration is an evil that should be avoided 
whenever possible, the question becomes why it shouldn’t be avoided 
here? As noted above, I take wage theft as a prototypical area where 
non-carceral responses seem like they should be able to do the trick and 
address the social problem.156 
But, even aside from some appeal to restorative justice, financial 
penalties, or other alternative sanctions, the question remains why 
exactly incapacitation is necessary? As noted in the context of the 
retributive justification, arguing for incapacitation here requires either: 
(a) acknowledging that many others who are currently incarcerated 
should stay incarcerated; or (b) arguing that bosses who commit wage 
theft are actually more in need of incapacitation than many other 
individuals currently behind bars. As in the retributive analysis, I think 
the former claim is troubling, and the latter claim is both politically and 
theoretically problematic. 
To a growing number of commentators, incapacitation should be the 
solution of last resort. Radical criminological and abolitionist literature 
often speaks of “the dangerous few” — even scholars and activists 
committed to dismantling the carceral state frequently recognize that 
 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2011) (discussing how incarcerated people often have to “choose 
between personal safety and the satisfaction of other basic . . . human needs”); Jeannie 
Suk, Redistributing Rape, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 111 (2011) (“Prison is hell.”). 
 155 There are many possible explanations for this failure or, at least, this exceptional 
treatment that I will address later. But I think it’s fair to ask how much we might 
attribute these pro-carceral arguments to a siloing of legal areas or disciplines, i.e., 
criminal law is somehow different and distinct from other areas of law, so the concerns 
and politics that shape the analysis of criminal law might be lacking or viewed as 
different from the concerns and politics that predominate in discussions of employment 
law. See Benjamin Levin, Rethinking the Boundaries of “Criminal Justice,” 15 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 619, 633 (2018) [hereinafter Rethinking Boundaries] (book review); cf. Kate 
Andrias, An American Approach to Social Democracy: The Forgotten Promise of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, 128 YALE L.J. 616, 622 (2019) (critiquing the labor/employment 
law distinction); Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American 
Work Law, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 165 (2007) (critiquing the distinction 
among labor law, employment law, and employment discrimination as a formalist 
mischaracterization of “work law”); Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part 
I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 5 (2011) (critiquing the move to exceptionalize “family 
law”). 
 156 See supra Part II.A.  
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some small portion of the population might continue to pose a danger, 
such that it is in society’s best interest to restrict their liberty in some 
way.157 If we were to imagine some dramatic reconfiguration of U.S. 
political economy (and the political economy of punishment), perhaps 
some of these bosses might be the “dangerous few.” But, such a 
reconfiguration seems rather far-fetched and also would require a 
recognition that the harm done by abusive bosses is greater than the 
harm done by many individuals who commit crimes commonly viewed 
as more egregious.158 Further, even imagining such a dramatic 
reconfiguration or reconceptualization of criminality, would all bosses 
who commit wage theft constitute the dangerous few?  
In a sense, this last question speaks to one of the challenges of the 
wage-theft discourse: so much conduct is defined as “wage theft.”159 
And, as I suggested at the outset of this Article, perhaps so much more 
could be. Wage theft might encompass: (a) withholding worker’s 
compensation insurance from a paycheck, and not paying that amount 
to the state; (b) failing to pay time-and-a-half for overtime; (c) failing to 
pay taxes; (d) paying below the statutorily mandated minimum wage; 
(e) taking tips; or (f) not paying workers at all.160 This conduct might 
all be immoral, it might all be illegal, and it might all help entrench 
economic inequality, but is it all equally bad? How often would an 
employer have to steal tips before she was viewed as “the worst of the 
worst”? To what extent should the employer’s own financial or class 
situation weigh into this analysis? Which is to say, the “dangerous few” 
might not be so few, or at the very least, if one wished to subscribe to 
an abolitionist ethic and still support incarceration for wage theft, I 
think there would need to be a reckoning with and perhaps more careful 
 
 157 See Liat Ben-Moshe, The Tension Between Abolition and Reform, in THE END OF 
PRISONS: REFLECTIONS FROM THE DECARCERATION MOVEMENT 83, 90 (Mechthild E. Nagel 
& Anthony J. Nocella II eds., 2013) (discussing “what to do with those deemed as 
having the most challenging behaviors”); see, e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition 
and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1171 (2015) (“[T]he question of the 
dangerous few ought not to eclipse or overwhelm the urgency of a thorough abolitionist 
analyses . . . .”); Jim Thomas & Sharon Boehlefeld, Rethinking Abolitionism: “What Do 
We Do With Henry?,” in WE WHO WOULD TAKE NO PRISONERS: SELECTIONS FROM THE 
FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PENAL ABOLITION (Brian D. MacLean & Harold E. 
Pepinsky eds., 1993). 
 158 See Levin, Mens Rea Reform, supra note 25, at 556.  
 159 See Marzán, Dignity Takings, supra note 74, at 1204 n.11 (“The worker center 
where the author performed participatory research . . . had identified at least twenty-
two forms of ‘wage theft.’”). 
 160 See Green, supra note 50, at 1308-11 (describing conduct that constitutes wage 
theft). 
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analysis of what conduct fell into the category where no response short 
of caging would be acceptable.  
D. Rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation provides scant support for a move to prosecute or 
incarcerate bosses for wage theft.161 Criminalization advocates 
themselves do not ground their arguments in terms of rehabilitation, 
which should be little surprise given the theory’s declining significance 
and the mismatch between the realities of the carceral system and any 
objective of personal betterment.162 
The only remotely credible rehabilitation-based argument strikes me 
as forcing bosses to confront their workers’ humanity. That argument 
may speak the language of rehabilitation — the goal of punishment is 
to improve the defendant and make her a better member of the polity. 
But I am hard-pressed to come up with any reason why putting a person 
in a cage would help her understand another person’s humanity.163 
There might be arguments as to why prosecution and the trial or 
sentencing process would accomplish this goal: the employer might be 
forced to listen to her workers explain just how much they had suffered 
and illustrate the human costs of the crime. But it is not clear that 
criminal law or criminal legal institutions are necessary to advance 
those ends. And why exactly would carceral punishment humanize 
workers further? I think it would not. At the very least, that strikes me 
as an empirical argument that requires testing before it could serve as a 
basis for expanding carceral populations and exposing more individuals 
to the harsh realities of the punitive system. The argument would have 
to be one rooted in the boss’s suffering as helping her appreciate the 
worker’s suffering. Yet such an argument reveals many of the same 
defects as the retributive-style analysis: victimized workers might have 
suffered in many ways, but the prosecution’s claim is not that an 
 
 161 See generally infra Part II.D. 
 162 See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal 
Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 718 (1995) (“Unfortunately, however, rehabilitation 
is no longer an objective of criminal law in the United States, and prison appears to have 
an antirehabilitative effect.” (footnotes omitted)); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in 
the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 
1681, 1702 (1992) (noting “the general inappropriateness of imprisonment for 
rehabilitation”). 
 163 To be clear, here and throughout I emphasize the carceral dimensions of 
criminalization and punishment because criminalization proponents tend to stress 
those dimensions and highlight carceral sentences as a distinguishing feature from tort 
or civil regulatory approaches to wage theft. 
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employer incarcerated her workers.164 A convicted boss would suffer 
some harm and dehumanization, yet that harm and dehumanization 
would be different than the one that the boss inflicted upon her 
workers.165 
E. Expressivism 
I see expressivism as providing one of the strongest justifications for 
wage theft criminalization, but also one of the most problematic. If 
criminalization and criminal punishment educate or send a message to 
the public (a fundamental assumption of expressive theories of 
punishment),166 then perhaps criminalizing wage theft makes sense: the 
decision sends a message that (a) employers exploiting workers is 
socially unacceptable, and (b) society cares about the marginalized and 
otherwise-powerless workers who are often victims of wage theft.167 As 
 
 164 That certainly might happen, but that is a different situation than the one at play 
in wage-theft fact patterns or described by criminal wage-theft statutes. 
 165 Perhaps one way of rationalizing this distinction is via what Aya Gruber describes 
as a “distributive theory of criminal law”: “that an offender ought to be punished, not 
because he is culpable or because punishment increases net security, but because 
punishment appropriately distributes pleasure and pain between the offender and 
victim.” Gruber, A Distributive Theory, supra note 72, at 1. 
 166 See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A 
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2000) (“At the most general level, 
expressive theories tell actors — whether individuals, associations, or the State — to act 
in ways that express appropriate attitudes toward various substantive values.”); Joel 
Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 400 (1965); Benjamin 
B. Sendor, Crime as Communication: An Interpretive Theory of the Insanity Defense and 
the Mental Elements of Crime, 74 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1427 (1986) (“Just as an offender 
conveys meaning to his victim or to the community through his conduct, that is, 
through his disrespect for protected interests, so the community — through its agents 
the sentencing judge and corrections system — responds by conveying meaning 
through the vehicle of punishment.”). 
 167 See, e.g., Charlene Obernauer, New York Construction Workers Remain at Risk 
Without Legislative Action, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Mar. 5, 2019), 
https://www.gothamgazette.com/opinion/8320-new-york-construction-workers-remain-
at-risk-without-legislative-action [https://perma.cc/V42S-G56A] (“By prosecuting bad 
actors for wage theft and dangerous labor violations, the DA’s office indicated that 
contractors are not above the law, especially when they are putting lives at risk.”); Terri 
Gerstein (@TerryGerstein), TWITTER (Jan. 9, 2019, 8:06 AM), 
https://twitter.com/TerriGerstein/status/1083032207961350144 [https://perma.cc/ 
9RLK-43PK] (“A man had three different companies work on his home, gave bad 
checks, then threatened to call immigration when they sought payment; now he’s been 
arrested. Boulder DA Michael Dougherty is taking action to protect workers.”); David 
Seligman (@daveyseligman), TWITTER (Jan. 9, 2019, 8:14 AM), https://twitter.com/ 
daveyseligman/status/1083034292354048001 [https://perma.cc/3LU7-ZCKE] (“Thanks 
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one commentator puts it, laws criminalizing wage theft “should help 
send a strong message to employers about the importance of following 
workplace laws. They should also send a strong message to hard 
working people that work is a thing of value and that intentionally 
stealing it is theft.”168  
This justification has some intuitive appeal, particularly when we 
consider wage theft alongside other areas where expressive theories 
tend to be mobilized.169 A common feature of the literature on 
expressive theories of punishment is a focus on victims and societal 
power dynamics.170 That is, in much discourse, the victim is framed as 
somehow weak, powerless, or otherwise marginalized, so prosecution 
and state violence are necessary to level the playing field.171 The call for 
criminal punishment often rests on a claim that society has tacitly 
 
to the Boulder DA for watching out for some of the most marginalized members of 
society [by prosecuting employers].”). 
 168 Gerstein, More States Should Follow New Colorado Policy, supra note 112. 
 169 In this section, I frame the discussion of criminal prosecution as signaling social 
care for a class of victims or their belonging in the community in terms of expressivism 
or criminal law’s expressive function. That said, Monica Bell’s work on “legal 
estrangement” might provide a more helpful frame for this analysis. Monica C. Bell, 
Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054 (2017) 
[hereinafter Police Reform]. In her discussion of policing, Bell argues for a move away 
from (or past) legitimacy and instead calls for a focus on estrangement. “From a robust 
legal estrangement perspective,” Bell argues, “the law’s purpose is the creation and 
maintenance of social bonds. An emphasis on inclusion implies concerns not only about 
how individuals perceive the police and the law (and thus whether those individuals 
cooperate with the state’s demands), but about the signaling function of the police and 
the law to groups about their place in society.” Id. at 2087-88.  
 170 See, e.g., Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. REV. 858, 860-61 
(2014) (discussing this dynamic in the context of hate crimes); Angela P. Harris, 
Heteropatriarchy Kills: Challenging Gender Violence in a Prison Nation, 37 WASH. U. J.L. 
& POL’Y 13, 34 (2011) (“Like expressive violence itself, criminal punishment is widely 
understood to ‘send a message’ – the message that women and sexual minorities 
matter.”); Kahan, supra note 116, at 463-64 (describing how punishment for hate 
crimes can be justified in expressive terms); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics 
of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 521 (2001) (“[T]he criminal provisions of the 
Violence Against Women Act might send a message to would-be batterers that our 
society takes domestic violence very seriously.”). 
 171 See Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or 
Tool for Criminal Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1265 (2000) (“Laws that treat 
bias-motivated assaults as distinctive harms worthy of federal prohibition accord status 
and prestige to the groups falling within the law’s ambit. As they enhance the prestige 
of these protected groups, they also reduce the prestige of others who may no longer 
define themselves as superior.”). 
  
1470 University of California, Davis [Vol. 54:1429 
accepted or tolerated this class of harm or the pain of this class of 
victims. Such acceptance may doubly harm the victim.172  
By way of example, take the cases of hate crime legislation and laws 
addressing intimate-partner violence. In both contexts, there has been 
a long history of state-sponsored, state-sanctioned, or, at least, state-
ignored violence against some marginalized or subordinated group.173 
The literature on “underenforcement” suggests that the failure to 
prosecute or severely punish men who beat their wives or partners, 
lynch mobs, and other socially dominant (or relatively socially 
dominant) defendants sent a broader message: this behavior was 
acceptable, and the victims were not full members of the polity 
deserving of the state’s protections.174 The victims, in this account, are 
twice victimized: first by the abuser, and then by the state.175 
Arguments for wage theft criminalization reflect a similar dynamic: 
workers (particularly low-wage workers, low-wage workers of color, 
and low-wage immigrant workers) enjoy little social, political, and 
economic power. They are the precariat, the liminal members of society 
on whose back the economy functions.176 Failing to protect them from 
 
 172 See id. 
 173 See Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 807 (2007) 
(describing “the ‘norming’ function of criminal law as a basis for reform[s]” aimed at 
addressing intimate partner violence). 
 174 See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW, at x (1997) (tracing the 
underenforcement of crimes against Black defendants); Alexandra Natapoff, 
Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1717 (2006) (“Underenforcement can also 
be a form of deprivation, tracking familiar categories of race, gender, class, and political 
powerlessness.”); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Underenforcement as Unequal Protection, 57 
B.C. L. REV. 1287, 1288-89 (2016) (“As is true of underenforcement generally, under-
policing tends to result from a devaluing of the harms caused by a specific crime, the 
harms suffered by members of a certain demographic group, or both.” (footnote 
omitted)). But see Paul Butler, (Color) Blind Faith: The Tragedy of Race, Crime, and the 
Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1270, 1273 (1998) (reviewing Kennedy, supra) (critiquing the 
focus on underenforcement). 
 175 See MARK S. UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE AND MEDIATION 196 (1994); see, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist 
Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2328-29 (1989) 
(discussing this phenomenon in the context of hate crimes). 
 176 See generally GUY STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS CLASS 10 
(2011) (“[T]he precariat consists of people who lack . . . labour-related security . . . .”); 
V.B. Dubal, The Drive to Precarity: A Political History of Work, Regulation, & Labor 
Advocacy in San Francisco’s Taxi & Uber Economies, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 73, 
135 (2017) [hereinafter The Drive to Precarity] (describing how precarity presents itself 
in the chauffeur industry); Angela P. Harris, From Precarity to Positive Freedom: 
Classcrits at Seven Classcrits VII Symposium Introduction, 44 SW. L. REV. 621, 630 (2015) 
(describing the economic and political roots of precarity); Loïc Wacquant, Marginality, 
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predatory bosses or to enforce laws that are meant to value their work 
and dignity is an affront to their status as members of the polity. It 
confirms suspicions that politicians and other elite actors value profits 
and the interests of the wealthy over the interests of workers. Criminal 
prosecution, the argument goes, represents the embodiment of society’s 
collective morality and the state’s moral force.177 And, a decision to 
prosecute bosses and criminalize their misconduct reflects a powerful 
move to right this wrong and to send a message that these workers are 
valued contributors to the economy and to the community.178  
This vision of expressive punishment stands as an amped up form of 
general deterrence.179 It’s not just that punishment is designed to shape 
the conduct and decision-making of rational employers.180 It’s that 
prosecution sends a message to everyone about the value of the victim, 
the nature of the harm, and the priorities of the state.  
Like deterrence arguments, though, expressivist claims rest on a set 
of empirical assumptions. Specifically, accepting an expressivist 
justification for criminalization and incarceration appears to require 
concluding that members of the public: (a) are aware of legislative 
activity, (b) view the passage of legislation as embodying community 
 
Ethnicity and Penality in the Neo-Liberal City: An Analytic Cartography, 37 ETHNIC & 
RACIAL STUD. 1687, 1688 (2014) (examining the role of the precariat in urban spaces). 
 177 See, e.g., ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 102 (W.D. Halls 
trans., 2014) (1893); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 138 (Alan Sheridan 
trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1993) (describing the effects of discipline on an individual’s 
sense of self); cf. KENNEDY, The Stakes of Law, supra note 9, at 107 (“[T]he legal system 
creates as well as reflects consensus (this is true both of legislation and of adjudication). 
Its institutional mechanism ‘legitimates,’ in the sense of exercising normative force on 
the citizenry.”). 
 178 Cf. Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 
94 YALE L.J. 1, 64 (1984) (“Expressive theory also emphasizes the communal nature of 
theory and its complex relations with social life. . . . Legal theory can help create 
communal ties and shared values by freeing us from the sense that current practices and 
doctrines are natural and necessary and by suggesting new forms of expression to 
replace outworn ones.”). 
 179 See Judith Lichtenberg, Against Life Without Parole, 11 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 39, 
49 n.45 (2019) (“The expressive function is sometimes understood to be a version of 
retributivism, although one might also view it as a close cousin of general deterrence.”); 
Jake Elijah Struebing, Federal Criminal Law and International Corruption: An Appraisal 
of the FIFA Prosecution, 21 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1, 53 (2018) (“General deterrence is also 
conceptually intertwined with an expressive account of wrongdoing.”). 
 180 That is, one might imagine a different version of expressive, or “communicative” 
punishment by which “the state has an interest in communicating a specific message to 
someone in particular.” Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the 
Commutation of Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 407, 429 n.99 (2005). 
  
1472 University of California, Davis [Vol. 54:1429 
norms, and (c) wish to conform their behavior to community norms. 
Second, the expressivist would need to believe that members of the 
public: (a) are aware of specific prosecutions, (b) view prosecutions and 
convictions as embodying community norms, and (c) wish to conform 
their behavior to community norms. Third — to my mind most 
important — that incarceration is uniquely or dramatically better suited 
to sending such a message than non-criminal sanctions.181 
These assumptions in turn rest on a host of baseline assumptions 
about the perceived legitimacy of state institutions (the legislature, 
prosecutors, courts, etc.). Or, put differently, how much are those 
institutions viewed as capable of expressing or vindicating community 
norms and values, to the extent that “community norms and values” are 
even defensible concepts?  
In the wage-theft context, victims generally come from communities 
without significant political clout. Given what we know about the 
demographics of criminal prosecution, poor people of color (often-
identified victims of wage theft) have good reason to believe that police 
and prosecutors do not represent their best interests.182 Decades of 
scholarship and growing activism show that the institutions of the 
criminal legal system hardly represent the “community values and 
norms” of heavily policed and prosecuted communities. And, 
particularly for undocumented workers, it seems peculiar to suggest 
that the same state actors who aid in enforcing immigration laws also 
should be viewed as advancing the interests of immigrant 
communities.183  
Further, the basic claim of expressivism (not unlike deterrence) rests 
on some vision of criminal punishment as public, i.e., a set of 
institutions or practices that the public sees and learns from. Yet, the 
legal system — comprised of arcane and complex rules — is hardly 
accessible to the public. And, in a post-trial world, where the vast 
majority of criminal cases are resolved without a public trial (and where 
there is reason to be skeptical that the public has any real access to 
courtrooms),184 this assumption of public engagement and education 
seems rather far-fetched. 
 
 181 For a related, skeptical take on the arguments and theoretical claims 
underpinning expressivism, see generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Joel Feinberg on Crime 
and Punishment: Exploring the Relationship Between The Moral Limits of the Criminal 
Law and The Expressive Function of Punishment, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 145 (2001). 
 182 See Bell, Police Reform, supra note 169, at 2061. 
 183 See Lee, supra note 13, at 664-65. 
 184 Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 911, 923 (2006) (discussing how plea bargaining occurs in private spaces, not 
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Even if we accept all of the assumptions that underpin the 
expressivist’s argument, there is a major question lurking: what about 
enforcement? If caging exploitative bosses is supposed to send a 
message about the community’s respect for the labor of marginalized 
workers, what if bosses are not actually arrested, prosecuted, convicted, 
and punished? And, even if they are arrested, prosecuted, convicted, 
and punished, what if their punishment is viewed as insufficient or 
merely a “slap on the wrist”? 
Criminal law is not self-executing. Its enforcement depends on the 
discretion of police and prosecutors who effectively determine what the 
law means.185 As William Stuntz described the challenge for 
expressivists: “What, after all, does expressive criminal law express? Is 
the message the law that the legislature passes? Or is it the sum of the 
arrest and prosecution decisions of individual police officers and 
prosecutors?”186 To the extent the law is the law on the ground, rather 
than the law on the books,187 and to the extent that expressive effect 
requires the law in action,188 then the relevant inquiry must be how a 
criminal statute actually is being enforced. 
Take the example of intimate partner violence, discussed above, and 
the federal Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”):189 
On the one hand, the criminal provisions of [VAWA] might 
send a message to would-be batterers that our society takes 
domestic violence very seriously, much more so than it used to. 
On the other hand, the tiny number of prosecutions under the 
Act (only a handful per year nationwide) might send precisely 
the opposite message: that domestic violence is a subject for 
 
open courtrooms); see also William Ortman, Probable Cause Revisited, 68 STAN. L. REV. 
511, 562 (2016) (tracing the rise of plea bargaining); Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal 
Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173, 2190 (2014) (explaining 
how the public is excluded from courtrooms). 
 185 See Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Myth of Common Law Crimes, 105 VA. L. REV. 965, 
968-69 (2019); Stuntz, supra note 170, at 521. 
 186 Stuntz, supra note 170, at 521. 
 187 See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Jumping Bunnies and Legal Rules: The Organizational 
Sociologist and the Legal Scholar Should Be Friends, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
THINKING 246, 246-47 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., NYU Press 2017). 
 188 See Eisenberg, supra note 170, at 918 (“When legislators enact a new law to 
protect a particular group, that piece of legislation is imbued with expressive force for 
members of the group and society as a whole. If prosecutors are understood to be 
sending a different or contrary message through their enforcement decisions, this 
expressive force is significantly undercut. An exclusive focus on the enactment of such 
legislation is therefore misguided.”). 
 189 34 U.S.C. § 12361(b) (2018). 
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political posturing, the sort of thing politicians decry but 
prosecutors do not punish. At the least, the absence of 
prosecution must indicate that the federal government is not 
really interested in the subject, which would seem to take away 
much of the expressive benefit of having the Act in the first 
place.190 
There might be plenty of other ways to justify VAWA, but the insight 
here is important: if expressive laws are not enforced (or are not 
enforced satisfactorily),191 then hasn’t the law just reified and 
entrenched the same inequalities it was intended to address?192 
Given stated concerns from wage theft criminalization proponents, 
there is reason to believe that prosecutors and police might not 
necessarily embrace an aggressive approach to enforcement.193 And, 
even if prosecutors were enthusiastic about taking wage theft cases, why 
should we believe that low-income people of color and immigrant 
workers will be comfortable reporting to and cooperating with 
police?194 I will take up this question further in the next Part, but it is 
not unreasonable to conclude that “distrust of the police [among 
communities often victimized by wage theft] effectively neutralizes the 
potential of wage theft statutes.”195 
 
 190 Stuntz, supra note 170, at 521. 
 191 The question of what exactly constitutes appropriate or satisfactory punishment 
is a big one. And, the cultural temptation to treat defendants as having “gotten off” if 
they receive a relatively short carceral sentence speaks to the challenges of doing 
criminal law expressively without turning law-and-order politics and fueling the 
carceral impulse. 
 192 See generally Eisenberg, supra note 170 (arguing that expressive legislation fails 
unless accompanied by expressive enforcement). 
 193 See, e.g., Daniel Beekman, Seattle Takes Aim at Wage Theft; First 3 Years of Law 
Came Up Empty, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 14, 2014, 10:57 AM), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/seattle-takes-aim-at-wage-theft-first-3-years-
of-law-came-up-empty/ [https://perma.cc/C6L6-7GZR] (“Seattle made wage theft a 
crime under city law in 2011, vowing to go after employers that intentionally cheat 
workers out of pay. But more than three years later, the Seattle Police Department 
and City Attorney’s Office have yet to prosecute anyone.”); Parisa Dehghani-Tafti, 
Opinion, Candidate Essay: Parisa Dehghani-Tafti, ARLNOW (June 10, 2019, 2:30 
PM), https://www.arlnow.com/2019/06/10/candidate-essay-parisa-dehghani-tafti/ 
[https://perma.cc/AZY5-VTQ7] (“[W]age earners said the [Commonwealth Attorney’s] 
office refuses to prosecute wage theft cases . . . .”). 
 194 See Lee, supra note 13, at 664-65 (“While wage theft statutes saddle the police 
with labor enforcement duties, federal programs have simultaneously piled on a wide 
range of immigration enforcement responsibilities, exacerbating the rift that has 
traditionally separated the police and immigrant communities.”). 
 195 Id. at 665. 
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Further, even assuming that police and prosecutors are on board, 
what kind of punishment would be sufficient to send the desired 
message?196 Calls for wage theft criminalization tend to stress 
incarceration and treat non-carceral punishment as insufficient. So, 
how much incarceration is necessary to signal that the state takes wage 
theft seriously? Given public outcry when defendants receive short 
carceral sentences — particularly in contexts where the defendants are 
perceived as relatively powerful197 — it is hard to imagine what an 
“acceptable” amount of incarceration would be. Indeed, recent wage 
theft criminalization efforts often focus on ensuring not only that wage 
theft is treated as a criminal matter, but that it is a felony, rather than a 
misdemeanor.  
For example, in 2015, when Washington State Attorney General Bob 
Ferguson chose to bring felony charges against former professional 
football player Sam Adams, Ferguson stressed that the prosecution 
“should be a warning to unscrupulous business owners.”198 Adams and 
his business partner allegedly failed to pay their health club employees 
$7,000.199 Adams faced up to five years in prison on thirty criminal 
charges, and prosecutors announced their intention to “seek an 
exceptionally harsh sentence” to send a message that “[i]f you don’t pay 
your workers for wages that they have earned, [the Attorney General’s] 
office will hold you accountable.”200 Despite the bravado and tough-on-
crime rhetoric, two years later, Adams agreed to a modified guilty plea, 
under which the charges were dropped and he paid the $7,000.201 
In a moment of reckoning with the punitive excesses of mass 
incarceration, I think it’s fair to question the propriety of seeking five 
years’ imprisonment for a $7,000 loss, of bringing a thirty-count 
indictment as a means of sending a message, and of using the sort of 
tough-on crime language that equates imprisonment and 
accountability. But, put all that aside for a moment. Even discounting 
 
 196 See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 197 See GRUBER, supra note 26, at 5 (discussing this dynamic in the context of 
prosecutions for sexual violence). 
 198 Levi Pulkkinen, AG: Ex-Seahawk Bilked State, Workers at His Health Clubs, SEATTLE 
POST-INTELLIGENCER (Nov. 21, 2017, 9:57 PM), https://www.seattlepi.com/seattlenews/ 
article/AG-Ex-Seahawk-bilked-state-workers-at-his-6066837.php [https://perma.cc/2UQU-
6EKQ]. 
 199 Id. 
 200 See id. 
 201 See Levi Pulkkinen, Dismissal: 30 Charges Against Seahawk-Turned-Gym Owner 
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the troublingly punitive politics that the case demonstrates, did it really 
work? Perhaps the publicity the case attracted actually did send a 
message, and the selection of a high-profile defendant (who also 
happens to be Black) helped make wage-theft a recognizable problem. 
Yet, if the claim is that criminal punishment actually does the important 
work, the case looks like a resounding failure. Further, we might ask 
how many resources went into a two-year criminal case and whether 
those resources might have been used more effectively to reach the same 
redistributive end. 
III. A DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF WAGE THEFT CRIMINALIZATION 
The traditional theories of punishment traced above — fixtures 
formalist treatments of criminal law that have been entrenched in 
numerous criminal codes202 — provide a limited and at-times deceptive 
window into the workings of the carceral state.203 They speak the 
language of morality, of rational actors, or of impersonal, ostensibly 
apolitical institutional design. In short, they are a poor fit for structural 
accounts of criminal law as a political creature, an engine of social 
control, or a tool of redistribution and oppression.204 
While advocates for wage theft criminalization often speak in the 
register of these traditional theories, and while the theories certainly 
might be marshalled in support of policy proposals, I see the case for 
criminalization — and the debate around criminalization — as rooted 
inherently in a set of distributive and structural questions: How should 
society deal with rising economic inequality and the limited political 
power of low-wage workers? Is there a way to harness the resources and 
moral force of the state without empowering prosecutors, police, and 
other criminal enforcers? Is it acceptable to treat incarceration and 
accountability as conceptually interchangeable? Should we be more 
comfortable with embracing carceral solutions to social problems when 
a defendant is the more powerful party and a victim is the weaker or 
more vulnerable party? Do the redistributive purposes of 
criminalization proposals guarantee that the corner of the criminal 
system will be immune from the regressive and abusive realities of the 
 
 202 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018) (stating that judges should consider these 
purposes of punishment in determining an appropriate sentence). 
 203 Cf. Jeffrie G. Murphy, “In the Penal Colony” and Why I Am Now Reluctant to Teach 
Criminal Law, 33 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 72, 76 (2014) (“I have come to think that our body 
of substantive criminal law influenced by the Model Penal Code is a rather beautiful 
little boat floating on a sea of excrement, and I am no longer comfortable sailing in that 
little boat while ignoring the excrement.”). 
 204 See sources cited supra note 69. 
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carceral state? To what extent should the progressive politics of 
criminalization proponents and the ostensibly progressive politics of 
criminal enforcement insulate policy proposals from left critiques? And 
what are the broader structural costs of accepting or endorsing the pro-
prosecutorial move in the context of wage theft? 
All of which is to say that wage theft criminalization is justified most 
forcefully in distributive terms.205 So, the question remains how exactly 
wage theft prosecutions would distribute — who would be prosecuted, 
and what would be the impact of prosecution? Or, put simply, “who 
wins and who loses?”206 Such a “distributional analysis” of wage theft 
criminalization would “involve[] meticulous and deliberate 
contemplation of the many interests affected by the existing criminal 
law regime and evidence-informed predictions about how law reform 
might redistribute harms and benefits, not just imminently but over 
time.”207 This distributional approach — a staple of critical 
scholarship208 — “treats law as simply another way of doing politics and 
cuts through metaphysical, culturalist, economicist, and other 
mystifications of the law and legal discourse.”209 In the context of 
criminal law, this approach can — and has — shown the ways that 
progressive or ostensibly pro-minority criminalization projects can have 
unintended consequences.210  
In this Part, I look first at the distributional case for, and then the 
distributional case against wage theft criminalization. 
A. Redistribution via Criminalization 
At heart, the case for wage theft criminalization, greater prosecution, 
and the incarceration of abusive bosses rests on a redistributionist 
politics. Each of the theoretical justifications traced above ultimately 
comes down to a story about power, exploitation, and addressing deep 
structural inequality. What makes wage theft so concerning and what 
 
 205 See supra Part II.B. 
 206 Jorge L. Esquirol, Legal Latin Americanism, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 145, 
162 (2013). 
 207 Aya Gruber, When Theory Met Practice: Distributional Analysis in Critical Criminal 
Law Theorizing, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3211, 3213 (2015) [hereinafter When Theory Met 
Practice]. 
 208 See, e.g., Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Rachel Rebouché & Hila Shamir, 
Preface to GOVERNANCE FEMINISM: NOTES FROM THE FIELD, at xvii (2019); Esquirol, supra 
note 206, at 161-62; Gruber, When Theory Met Practice, supra note 207, at 3213; Levin, 
Mens Rea Reform, supra note 25, at 496. 
 209 Esquirol, supra note 206, at 161-62. 
 210 See Gruber, When Theory Met Practice, supra note 207, at 3213. 
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has made the phrase itself such a resonant organizing and advocacy tool 
is the image of the haves stealing from the have-nots. In a system that 
operates against a background presumption of at-will employment and 
where background property rules serve to entrench and preserve 
economic inequality,211 employers enjoy many structural advantages 
over workers, particularly low-wage workers. Combine these 
longstanding dynamics with the rise of mandatory arbitration clauses,212 
the erosion of unions,213 and the growth of the so-called “gig 
economy,”214 and the U.S. workplace becomes a place of almost 
unfettered employer power.  
This account of power imbalances recurs time and again in calls for 
expanding criminal solutions. Wage theft represents the quintessential 
abuse of power, and criminal law and prosecutors become the vehicle 
for remedying that imbalance, for giving voice to the voiceless and 
powerless.215 Critically, criminalization proponents argue that this 
 
 211 On this vision of background rules as central to legal analysis, see Hale, supra 
note 9, at 472; Karl E. Klare, Traditional Labor Law Scholarship and the Crisis of Collective 
Bargaining Law: A Reply to Professor Finkin, 44 MD. L. REV. 731, 767 (1985); K. Sabeel 
Rahman, Constructing Citizenship: Exclusion and Inclusion Through the Governance of 
Basic Necessities, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2447, 2459-60 (2018); Hila Shamir, A Labor 
Paradigm for Human Trafficking, 60 UCLA L. REV. 76, 109 (2012). 
 212 See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 240 (2013) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that arbitration clauses may “chok[e] off a plaintiff’s 
ability to enforce congressionally created rights”); Lauren B. Edelman, Aaron C. Smyth 
& Asad Rahim, Legal Discrimination: Empirical Sociolegal and Critical Race Perspectives 
on Antidiscrimination Law, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 395, 403 (2016) (describing the 
role of mandatory arbitration in thwarting employees’ civil rights claims); Jean R. 
Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1673 
(2005) (observing that mandatory arbitration impinges on substantive and procedural 
rights). 
 213 See, e.g., JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO 1 (2014) (noting that the 
unionization rate is at its lowest point since the early twentieth century); Kate Andrias, 
The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2016) (“American labor unions have collapsed. 
While they once bargained for more than a third of American workers, unions now 
represent only about a tenth of the labor market and even less of the private sector.”). 
 214 E.g., V.B. Dubal, Winning the Battle, Losing the War?: Assessing the Impact of 
Misclassification Litigation on Workers in the Gig Economy, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 739, 740-
41 [hereinafter Winning the Battle]; see Cynthia Estlund, What Should We Do After Work? 
Automation and Employment Law, 128 YALE L.J. 254, 285 (2018) (“[F]or many U.S. 
workers and their families, the devolution of stable and decently paid jobs into insecure 
and undependable contingent work and gigs is a socioeconomic disaster.”). 
 215 See Terri Gerstein & David Seligman, A Response to “Rethinking Wage Theft 
Criminalization,” ONLABOR (Apr. 20, 2018), https://onlabor.org/a-response-to-
rethinking-wage-theft-criminalization/ [https://perma.cc/4AMR-PZZF] (“[T]he threat 
of serious criminal sanction running . . . against the person who’s abused his position 
of power . . . helps to correct that power imbalance . . . .”). 
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dynamic makes wage theft different from many other areas of criminal 
law.216 Elsewhere (e.g., in the context of drug crime), prosecutors and 
police are abusive and the criminal system disproportionately harms 
people of color. Many criminalization proponents are careful to insist 
that they oppose mass incarceration, that those bad or problematic areas 
of criminal law are bad or problematic. But prosecuting wage theft 
represents the true purpose of the criminal legal system.  
Interestingly, many district attorney candidates running under the 
mantle of “progressive prosecutors” have stressed that they would make 
wage theft cases a priority.217 Decarceration and declination (i.e., not 
prosecuting entire classes of crime) elsewhere might be central to the 
progressive prosecutor’s agenda,218 but wage theft represents a different 
problem: a problem of under-enforcement.219 And, where other 
defendants are deserving of greater humanization, sympathy, or 
empathy, as prosecutors and reformers seek non- or less-punitive 
responses, wage theft defendants are in need of the harsh justice that 
the carceral system offers.  
For example, despite his much-publicized decision not to pursue a 
range of drug- and sex-work-related offenses, reformist Philadelphia 
District Attorney Larry Krasner created a specific unit designed to 
prosecute wage theft cases.220 Similarly, Tiffany Cabán, the public 
defender and Democratic Socialist who came within a few votes of being 
elected District Attorney in Queens, promised to set up a wage theft unit 
because, “by ending prosecution of crimes of poverty and prioritizing 
 
 216 See Gerstein & Seligman, supra note 215 (“[W]e don’t think that bringing the 
criminal law to bear on predatory employers who take advantage of vulnerable workers 
exacerbates the injustices of our criminal justice system.”). 
 217 See Levin, Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor, supra note 25, at 24-25. 
 218 See, e.g., Maria Cramer, DA Candidate Rachel Rollins Hailed Nationally, But Locally 
Her Plan Not to Prosecute Petty Crimes Alarms Some, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 12, 2018, 9:46 PM), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/09/12/candidate-hailed-nationally-but-locally-
her-plan-not-prosecute-petty-crimes-alarms-some/pyQX8MT4iWpyJ8XMi6SsFO/story. 
html [https://perma.cc/FEL9-EEEN] (describing one progressive prosecutor’s plan to 
dismiss certain crimes like trespassing, shoplifting, and drug possession or treat them as 
civil infractions); Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, The National Police 
Association Is Throwing a Fit Over Prosecutorial Discretion, SLATE (Jan. 4, 2019, 12:55 PM), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/01/national-police-association-throwing-fit. 
html [https://perma.cc/TMC6-KY5V] (discussing prosecutorial declination). 
 219 See Karakatsanis, supra note 123, at 886. 
 220 See Juliana Feliciano Reyes, Philly DA’s Office Launches a Unit to Prosecute 





1480 University of California, Davis [Vol. 54:1429 
prosecution of abusive and exploitative landlords and bosses, she sent 
a simple message: Free the poor and jail the rich.”221  
In this telling, the carceral state isn’t rotten to its core;222 rather, it is 
an institution (or set of institutions) in need of refocusing. If only 
legislators would empower prosecutors with new criminal statutes, and 
if only prosecutors embraced the progressive politics of workers’ rights 
advocates (the argument goes), then the punitive apparatus could be 
repurposed to go after the truly deserving defendants.223 
Central to this argument remains a perception of inequality in 
enforcement: property crimes are enforced frequently, and are 
frequently enforced against poor defendants.224 Why should wealthier 
defendants be excused when they commit theft?225 That is, 
criminalization proponents argue that there is effectively a white-collar 
theft exception, whereby prosecutors, and presumably police, don’t 
view what abusive or exploitative bosses do as “theft,” while they 
continue to pursue charges against poor defendants, particularly poor 
defendants of color, who commit low-level property crime. The way to 
address this inequality, according to criminalization proponents is to 
“level-up” punishment — to treat the richer, more powerful, or more 
privileged defendant more like the poorer, less powerful, or less 
privileged defendant.226 This claim underpins the rhetorical 
move/organizing strategy to assert that “wage theft is theft.” According 
to this logic, society has devised a mechanism or set of mechanisms to 
 
 221 Oren Schweitzer, Tiffany Cabán, a Socialist in the District Attorney’s Office, JACOBIN 
(June 26, 2019), https://jacobinmag.com/2019/06/tiffany-caban-socialist-district-
attorney-queens-election [https://perma.cc/6A2B-UDCQ]. 
 222 But see infra Part III.B.  
 223 See Gerstein & Seligman, supra note 215 (“While criminal sanction should be 
invoked carefully and only for very bad actors, the threat of prosecution is an important 
and effective tool in policing wage theft, which is one of the most prevalent crimes in 
the market and inflicts serious harm on the most marginalized members of society.”). 
 224 See Schweitzer, supra note 221. 
 225 See OFFICE OF SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN, RIGGED JUSTICE: 2016 HOW WEAK 
ENFORCEMENT LETS CORPORATE OFFENDERS OFF EASY 1 (2016), https://www.warren. 
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(“If justice means a prison sentence for a teenager who steals a car, but it means nothing 
more than a sideways glance at a CEO who quietly engineers the theft of billions of 
dollars, then the promise of equal justice under the law has turned into a lie.”). 
 226 See generally Aya Gruber, Equal Protection Under the Carceral State, 112 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1337 (2018) [hereinafter Equal Protection] (describing and critiquing this 
approach); Levin, Mens Rea Reform, supra note 25, at 491-92 (describing the tendency 
of advocates to argue that the “privileged defendant should be treated as poorly as the 
disadvantaged defendant, rather than using the privileged defendant’s treatment as a 
model”); Kate Levine, Discipline and Policing, 68 DUKE L.J. 839 (2019) [hereinafter 
Discipline and Policing] (same). 
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address theft: prison, the criminal system, and a web of punitive 
policies. Rather than being exceptionalized, the argument goes, bosses 
should be treated like the defendants that society already marks as 
“criminal” and exposed to the same carceral system and set of punitive 
or prosecutorial institutions. 
Some scholars and advocates might embrace that punitive turn 
wholeheartedly,227 while others might do so with reservations but some 
sense of pragmatism:228 It is unlikely that many DAs will stop 
prosecuting property crime altogether or that legislators will pass 
legislation that decriminalizes the poor teenager’s theft of a candy bar 
from a convenience store; so, why should the wealthier thief get a pass? 
This more reserved (or carcerally skeptical) criminalization proponent 
might agree that all property crime should be decriminalized or that 
carceral politics generally should be dialed back. But until we see a sea 
change in criminal policy, bosses should not be spared state violence. 
Or, put differently, wide scale decarceration might be a desirable goal, 
but wage theft and the abuses of capital are not the right place to start a 
decarceration project.229 
B. The Distributive Limits of Criminalization 
As a project rooted in the language of social justice and egalitarian 
politics, wage theft criminalization should be justified most strongly on 
distributive terms. And, the previous subpart outlined that distributive 
account. Yet, the rhetoric and reality of the carceral turn here do not 
necessarily match. In this subpart, I turn first to the complicated 
distributive realities of “white-collar crime,” before addressing deeper 
concerns about the potential legitimating effects of wage theft 
criminalization.  
1. Cultural Narratives, Distributive Justice, and White-Collar 
Crime 
As applied to wage theft criminalization, distributional analysis 
should help push past the assumptions that appear to motivate many 
commentators as they decry wage theft as a part of general impunity on 
 
 227 See generally infra Part IV.  
 228 See generally infra Part IV. 
 229 This debate plays out in other contexts involving powerful and particularly 
unsympathetic defendants. See, e.g., Elisabeth Epps, Amber Guyger Should Not Go to 
Prison, APPEAL (Oct. 7, 2019), https://theappeal.org/amber-guyger-botham-jean/ 
[https://perma.cc/X5UR-HY4G] (same); Levine, Discipline and Policing, supra note 226 
(critiquing punitive approaches to police misconduct). 
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the part of “white-collar” defendants. One way of understanding the 
exceptional treatment of wage theft as distinct from many other areas of 
the criminal system relies on its status as “white-collar crime.”230 Where 
the truly offensive parts of the criminal enforcement apparatus involve 
urban misdemeanor prosecutions and felony prosecutions against 
marginalized defendants,231 white-collar defendants experience an 
entirely different “criminal justice system.”232 The result is a “two-
tiered” system, where the problems at the top (e.g., underenforcement, 
insufficient punishment, and criminal law as failed and toothless 
regulatory regime) are almost the complete inverse of those at the 
bottom (e.g., overpolicing, overpunishment, and criminal law as 
oppressive institution of social control).233  
Whether this account is generally accurate as a descriptive matter, it 
is important to recognize the complexity of “white-collar crime” as a 
descriptive category, a complexity that should bear on our 
understanding of wage theft criminalization. In common parlance and 
the cultural imagination, white-collar crime is the province of wealthier, 
whiter defendants.234 Discourse surrounding white-collar crime tends 
 
 230 The distinction helps illustrate why it might be a mistake to call the 
administration of criminal law a “system” at all. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME 
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 461 (1993); Monica Bell, Stephanie Garlock & 
Alexander Nabavi-Noori, Toward a Demosprudence of Poverty, 69 DUKE L.J. 1473, 1528 
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 232 See Alexandra Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
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 233 See id. at 89. 
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to focus on corporate actors, executives, and defendants associated with 
the excesses and exploitative realities of capitalism — defendants who 
are seen (rightly, I would argue) as having built fortunes on the backs 
of working peoples’ labor. And, in the context of wage theft, advocates 
frequently identify large employers as some of the greatest 
perpetrators.235 Put simply, the language of wage theft criminalization 
mirrors pro-prosecutorial language throughout the white-collar realm: 
punishment is necessary to redistribute and to tamp down the forces of 
inequality. 
The reality of white-collar crime and its enforcement is more 
complicated, and — based on what little anecdotal evidence we have — 
the reality of wage theft looks to be as well. In a 2000 study,236 the FBI 
reported that the mean amount stolen or counterfeited in “white-collar 
incidents” was $9,254.75, the median was $210, and the mode was 
$100.237 Over three times more “economic crimes” were committed at 
convenience stores (129,749) than at banks (38,364).238 Granted, the 
majority of white-collar defendants were white men in their late 
twenties and early thirties.239 But the scale of the incidents and what 
they included (low-level property crimes, check fraud, etc.) fails to jibe 
 
AND LAW AND ORDER 26-27 (1978) (discussing the role of policing in shaping narrative 
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with the dominant cultural (and legal) imagination of “white-collar 
crime.” 
One response to this observation, of course, might be that the 
problem is definitional. White-collar crime was initially defined in the 
1930s to refer to “high-status persons engaging in occupation-based 
crimes,”240 but the FBI now defines white collar crime as 
synonymous with the full range of frauds committed by 
business and government professionals. These crimes are 
characterized by deceit, concealment, or violation of trust and 
are not dependent on the application or threat of physical force 
or violence. The motivation behind these crimes is financial — 
to obtain or avoid losing money, property, or services or to 
secure a personal or business advantage.241 
However, “[t]he term ‘white collar crime’ means different things to 
different disciplines, as well as to different camps within those 
disciplines.”242 And there is a general lack of clarity as to whether the 
classification refers primarily to the identity of the defendant or the 
nature of the conduct. In short, the legal academic literature on “white-
collar crime” reflects no consensus as to what makes this class of crimes 
distinct.  
Such a line-drawing or categorization problem is hardly endemic to 
the realm of white-collar crime.243 Yet it is important to recognize who 
draws those lines: ultimately judges, but — in the first instance — law 
enforcement and prosecutors.244 And it appears that the definition of 
white-collar crime that is applied by these front-line actors is one that 
sweeps in many offenses involving small sums of money. The defendant 
labeled as a “white collar criminal” might just as well be someone who 
passes a bad check at a convenience store, as Bernie Madoff. Indeed, 
given the difficulty of obtaining a conviction in a complex financial 
 
 240 Miriam H. Baer, Sorting Out White-Collar Crime, 97 TEX. L. REV. 225, 227 n.2 
(2018). 
 241 White-Collar Crime, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/white-collar-crime (last 
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fraud case involving well-resourced defendants,245 there is good reason 
to think that the bad check, rather than the massive Ponzi scheme, will 
be the offense that will lead to a prosecution, a conviction, and a prison 
sentence. Put simply, the cultural framing of white-collar crime does 
not appear to match the reality of the law or its enforcement. So, arguing 
for more white-collar enforcement, without greater specificity,246 need 
not yield the distributive consequences that proponents envision.247 
As one particular corner of white-collar crime, wage theft 
criminalization should raise similar concerns. The general narratives, 
rhetoric, and intuitions that appear to guide criminalization proponents 
speak to a specific intersectional power dynamic: wealthy bosses (often 
coded as white or large corporate actors) are exploiting poor 
marginalized workers (often people of color, immigrants, and so on).248 
Based on the data that we have, the claim that wage theft particularly 
harms these particularly vulnerable workers appears to be well-
supported.249 Many of the industries identified as hotbeds of wage theft 
are disproportionately staffed by Black and Latinx workers, and, in 
several instances, are disproportionately staffed by women.250 
 
 245 See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS 
COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS 1 (2014) (“It is hard to think of prosecutors as the 
little guy in any fight. Yet they may play the role of David when up against the largest 
and most powerful corporations in the world.”). 
 246 It’s possible that laws might be drafted to target specific classes of defendants or 
misfeasance on a particular scale. See OFFICE OF SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN, CORPORATE 
EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY ACT 2, https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2019.4. 
2%20Corporate%20Executive%20Accountability%20Act%20Text.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
2DU5-JY57] (specifying that prosecution may only involve defendants with a sufficiently 
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concerns. See Carissa Byrne Hessick & Benjamin Levin, Elizabeth Warren’s Proposal to 
Imprison More Corporate Executives Is a Bad Idea, SLATE (Apr. 4, 2019, 1:39 PM), 
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negligence-mass-incarceration.html [https://perma.cc/57NA-8U9A]. 
 247 This dynamic is not uncommon in the realm of progressive criminalization 
projects. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, A Provocative Defense, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 273-74 
(2015) (discussing whether provocation reform would reduce gendered violence); 
Levin, Guns and Drugs, supra note 25, at 2173 (describing how gun and drug law reform 
may not solve social problems). 
 248 See supra Part II.B. 
 249 See ANNETTE BERNHARDT, RUTH MILKMAN, NIK THEODORE, DOUGLAS HECKATHORN, 
MIRABAI AUER, JAMES DEFILIPPIS, ANA LUZ GONZÁLEZ, VICTOR NARRO, JASON PERELSHTEYN, 
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pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
E743-CA8D] [hereinafter BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS]. 
 250 See Mattera, supra note 235, at 3. 
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From a distributional standpoint, things get dicier when we look at 
the defendants (i.e., the bosses). Large corporate employers certainly 
have been singled out for wage theft enforcement actions.251 The five 
parent companies assessed the largest cumulative penalties are Walmart 
(over $1.4 billion), FedEx (over $500 million), Bank of America (over 
$380 million), and the poster-child for corporate misfeasance Wells 
Fargo (over $200 million).252 Yet, incarceration is not a part of the 
conversation in the regulation of these entities. Instead, many of the 
industries, employers, and workplaces identified in the literature on 
criminalization look very different. Commentators point to restaurants, 
construction, home care, nail salons.253 Exposés of these industries have 
prompted public outcry and have spurred calls for criminal prosecution 
— the victims are society’s most marginalized.254 But this narrative 
generally fails to reckon with the fact that many of these industries 
“consist[] of small, often immigrant-owned businesses.”255 Indeed, 
looking at press releases and media coverage resulting from criminal 
wage theft cases, the defendants often fit this description.256 That is, 
when district attorneys tout potential carceral sentences and set high 
bail amounts, they frequently are not dealing with high-ranking 
executives at multinational corporations; they are punishing middle 
 
 251 See id. at 8-10. 
 252 Id. at 9. 
 253 See, e.g., BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS, supra note 
249, at 4 (discussing construction and restaurants); MATTERA, supra note 235, at 22 
(discussing restaurants); Dubal, Winning the Battle, supra note 214, at 751 (discussing 
construction, home care, and nail salons); Michele Gilman & Rebecca Green, The 
Surveillance Gap: The Harms of Extreme Privacy and Data Marginalization, 42 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 253, 266 (2018) (discussing restaurants, construction, and nail 
salons). 
 254 See generally Nicole Taykhman, Defying Silence: Immigrant Women Workers, Wage 
Theft, and Anti-Retaliation Policy in the States, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 96, 96-100 
(2016) (discussing a New York Times exposé of wage theft in the nail salon industry). 
 255 Id. at 100. 
 256 See, e.g., A.G. Underwood Announces Jail Time for Southampton Princess Diner 
Owner and Recovery Of $132,000 in Stolen Wages for 23 Restaurant Workers, N.Y. ST. OFF. 
ATT’Y GEN. (Dec. 7, 2018), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-underwood-announces-
jail-time-southampton-princess-diner-owner-and-recovery-132000 [https://perma.cc/ 
LNR8-9T92]; Contractor Sentenced for Criminal Wage Theft, False Reporting of Workers’ 
Comp Payments, WASH. ST. OFF. ATT’Y GEN. (July 27, 2018), 
https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/contractor-sentenced-criminal-wage-theft-
false-reporting-workers-comp-payments [https://perma.cc/7M2N-556H].  
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managers,257 minority business owners of small firms, and minor 
players in small markets. 
This is not to say that the defendants in these cases — Sonny Nicholas 
the sixty-two-year-old contractor held on ten thousand dollars bail and 
facing a year in jail for his alleged failure to pay $2,300;258 Sourin 
Babayan, the sixty-four-year-old contractor facing over fifty-seven years 
in prison and held on $200,000 bail for allegedly stealing wages from 
workers on a public construction project259 — were blameless or did 
not harm workers. Rather, it is to stress that these defendants may not 
look like the corporate monoliths or captains of industry who are often 
painted as driving the exploitative employment practices that result in 
worker exploitation.260 Criminalization proponents still might be 
comfortable embracing carceral solutions if defendants were less 
affluent, non-white, or less representative of the “too-big-to-jail” set. Yet 
doing so would reflect a different distributive vision. It would reflect 
that harm was done along lines of relative, rather than absolute, power 
differentials and that criminalization proponents were comfortable with 
criminal solutions that might harm minority defendants or defendants 
who did not represent the “1%.”261 That is, the clear victim-defendant 
binary that commentators embrace and that frames the parties at 
opposite ends of a stratified socioeconomic system might not actually 
 
 257 Cf. RENA STEINZOR, WHY NOT JAIL? 220 (2015) (noting that white-collar 
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reflect the dynamic in each case (or, in the cases that prosecutors appear 
to be bringing).262 
2. Legitimating Capital and the Carceral State 
Relatedly, the turn to criminal law in addressing wage theft risks 
legitimating the structures and structural flaws of both the criminal 
system and the contemporary market economy.263 
First, by framing “wage theft” as a specific class of employer conduct 
that is fundamentally immoral and opposed to workers’ interests, 
proponents of wage theft criminalization risk legitimating other 
employer behaviors and structures of economic inequality.264 There are 
many practices that exacerbate inequality, that harm workers, or that 
enrich bosses at the expenses of their workers. Many of these practices 
are not only legal, but widely accepted. It is widely understood that U.S. 
labor and employment laws are less worker-friendly than they could be 
and that employers have wide latitude in decisions about hiring, firing, 
and workplace management.265 So, what does it mean to say that some 
class of conduct is “wage theft” while other conduct is not? 
Indeed, as noted at the outset of this Article, radical left critics have 
long contended that the very structures of capitalism and wage labor 
 
 262 See, e.g., Jody Armour, N*gga Theory: Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity in the 
Substantive Criminal Law, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9, 55 (2014) (alteration in title) 
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abiding Americans see the common humanity in wrongdoers by helping them think 
beyond the boundaries of good and evil and praise and blame in criminal matters”); 
Shamir, supra note 211, at 135 (“The fixation on sex trafficking, with its supposedly 
clear-cut victims and villains, the focus on extreme cases, and the disregard for 
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policies.”). 
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Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation), in LENIN AND 
PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 127 (Ben Brewster trans., 1971); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A 
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NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. & 
trans., 1971); Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 
YALE L.J. 2176, 2189 (2013); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second 
Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 
109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 429-32 (1995).  
 264 Cf. generally Jamelia Morgan, Rethinking Disorderly Conduct, CALIF. L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (arguing that “disorderly conduct” laws construct the boundaries of what 
it means for conduct to be orderly and acceptable). 
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POLICY, 1947-1994, at 1 (1995); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of 
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(2005); Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act, supra note 3, at 265-70. 
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constitute theft. The Industrial Workers of the World, for example were 
famous for beginning public speeches with the cry of “Stop thief! I’ve 
been robbed. I’ve been robbed by the capitalist system.”266 This was not 
a legalistic claim about individual employers — rather it was a structural 
claim about the nature of wage labor.  
I do not mean to suggest that there are not meaningful gradations on 
the spectrum of employer/employee relations. Rather, I mean to suggest 
that by cordoning off one class of conduct as criminal and deserving of 
moral opprobrium, criminalization proponents are sending a signal that 
the other conduct, the other rules, and the other structures of the 
market are not objectionable, immoral, or deserving of societal 
condemnation.267 That might be perfectly acceptable when it comes to 
many aspects of employment. And that would be a reasonable course of 
action if these commentators viewed it as morally acceptable for 
enormously profitable fast food companies to pay minimum wage or for 
employers to take full advantage of the at-will doctrine to fire vulnerable 
or precarious workers. But workers’ rights advocates routinely frame 
minimum or living wage campaigns in moral terms — it is immoral to 
pay a worker less than a living wage.268 If such lawful (and non-
criminal) conduct is also objectionable, then I think there is harm done 
by drawing the line and identifying some set of conduct as criminal and 
as uniquely objectionable. If criminalization proponents are arguing 
that bosses should be caged because their conduct is immoral, then they 
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MONTHLY (Sept. 1, 1998), https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Living+Wage:+What+It+Is 
+and+Why+We+Need+It.-a021103427 [https://perma.cc/L45E-GWL3] (“And yet there 
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are implicitly sending a message that other employers’ conduct is not 
immoral, or, at least that it is different in kind.269 (Or, if they truly are 
embracing a carceral worldview, then why shouldn’t all employer 
misconduct be criminalized?) Contrary to advocates’ contentions, the 
turn to criminal law entrenches a narrative where the real problem is a 
few bad apples or bad actors, rather than a deeper set of structural 
problems.270 Using criminal law to address 
the social question in a strong form would contradict the 
fundamental logic of both the criminal system and the penal 
system as presently constituted. In keeping with the basic 
ideologies of individualism, these institutions were structured 
around ‘the individual,’ making it impossible . . . to put society 
in the dock.271 
Indeed, the legitimating effect is exacerbated by the capacious 
understanding of who is a victim of wage theft. Instead of confining 
victimization to workers, many criminalization proponents (and many 
commentators on wage theft, generally) take a broader view. Former 
Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis, for example, has argued that wage theft 
“harms the business owners who do play by the rules” because they face 
unfair competition from bosses who underpay,272 while Bobo and others 
argue that the state is a victim because it is deprived of tax revenue.273 
As a descriptive matter, that may be true — indeed, this sweeping 
understanding of victimhood echoes the sweeping understanding of 
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harm discussed earlier.274 And, of course, this logic echoes general 
“race-to-the bottom” arguments in favor of regulation.275 Yet, this broad 
frame suggests that labor markets and labor market regulation 
otherwise are both moral and acceptable. This conception of 
victimhood also evokes the idea of a “crime against the market,” a 
longstanding trope of prosecutions aimed at labor unions and left 
radicalism dating back at least to the nineteenth century.276 Rather than 
workers or even consumers as victims, the market as victim implies a 
troubling naturalization of market ordering.277 That is, the market 
generally is framed as just and good; the deviant behavior of bad bosses 
threatens to upset that balance.278 
Second, by turning to criminal law and defending its controversial 
practices (prosecutorial discretion, lengthy sentences, hefty cash bail, 
etc.), criminalization proponents further prop up the much-maligned 
institutions of the carceral state.279 The story of criminal law and its 
enforcement over the last half century is a story of ballooning prison 
populations, unconstrained prosecutorial power, and the mass 
surveillance and incarceration of marginalized populations. To most 
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scholars of criminal law, the core institutions have experienced (and are 
experiencing) a major crisis of legitimacy.280 To radical and abolitionist 
critics, the system is rotten to its core — mass incarceration and the 
carceral state are inherently linked to a history of structural racism, 
social control, and oppressive hierarchy.281 To other critics, the system 
is very much in need of reform and right-sizing to dial back dramatic 
racial disparities and refocus recourses and incentives.282 Either way, 
the growing scholarly consensus on the criminal system is that it is 
hardly a paragon of good governance and that turning to criminal law 
should raise a lot of red flags.283 
The rhetoric and policy proposals of wage theft criminalization 
proponents appear entirely divorced from this discourse and appear to 
have done little to internalize those critiques. In these accounts, there 
might be some bad or objectionable areas of criminal law enforcement 
(e.g., drug crime) that are defined by racially discriminatory policing, 
abusive prosecutions, and unnecessary incarceration. But, to these 
commentators, wage theft is different. Here, prosecutors are 
trustworthy, defendants are deserving of punishment, and the full force 
of state violence cannot come swiftly enough.284 
This desire to exceptionalize one area of criminal law is hardly 
exceptional to wage theft. But turning to criminal law here risks 
legitimating all of the other problematic institutions and dynamics that 
define other corners of the criminal system. If prisons are inhumane and 
degrading to conceptions of dignity, why not when the defendant has 
committed wage theft? If plea bargaining effectively robs a defendant of 
her constitutional rights and coerces her into waiving a fair trial, then 
why should plea bargaining in wage theft cases be okay? And, if the 
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legislative and judicial failure to rein in prosecutors is a problem 
elsewhere, why not here? 
By embracing uncritically the institutions of criminal law, proponents 
of wage theft criminalization send a dangerous message: those practices 
really are not so bad as long as the defendant is deserving.285 Further, they 
send a message to politicians and prosecutors that the way to appease 
progressives and to address inequality is to continue to “govern through 
crime.”286 This pattern creates bad incentives and stands to reward 
actors who are otherwise criticized for being outwardly hostile to 
egalitarian and redistributive projects. 
To a hammer, the saying goes, everything is a nail. And, to a 
prosecutor, everything is a crime. Or, more accurately, the way to 
address each problem should come via criminal law and prosecution. 
Take the example of former Attorney General Jeffrey Sessions and his 
treatment of transgender rights. Upon taking office, Sessions quickly 
took steps to roll back protections for transgender individuals in schools 
and workplaces.287 At the same time, though, Sessions devoted 
substantial resources to prosecuting federal hate crimes against 
transgender victims, in one case sending a senior trial attorney to Iowa 
to take the lead on the murder case of transgender high schooler Kedarie 
Johnson.288 
Regardless of one’s views on the merits of the Johnson case, it is 
important to recognize the narrow vision of civil rights and egalitarian 
politics that Sessions embodied. In this vision, the identity of the victim 
needn’t be important, and neither does the broader expressivist message 
that might be sent about holding transphobic people accountable. 
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Instead, the motivation for state action might be nothing more than the 
need to identify bad actors and punish them harshly for their bad 
conduct. Law breakers are law breakers. And law breakers deserve 
punishment. By clamoring for prosecutions, and hailing the harsh, 
punitive approach, commentators, activists, and scholars risk rewarding 
and reinforcing that vision. 
Further, despite claims about empowering workers that tend to 
underpin wage theft activism,289 this embrace of criminal law does not 
redistribute power or resources from bosses to workers; it distributes 
more power to the institutions of the carceral state. Jocelyn Simonson 
has argued that radical critics of the criminal system should view 
proposed reforms through a “power lens” and ask how power would be 
distributed: would marginalized communities and the relatively 
powerless or disempowered benefit, or would the reform strengthen the 
criminal apparatus.290 As discussed above, there certainly might be ways 
to address wage theft in a way that prioritized paying workers, restoring 
their dignity, or empowering them in the labor market.291 Instead, the 
turn to criminal law is shifting more power not just to the state, but to 
its punitive arm (an arm that, all else aside, is ill equipped to redistribute 
on these terms).292 As Monica Bell has argued, for scholars concerned 
about marginalized communities, “increasing the power of the state 
bears at most a spurious relationship to the outcome of concern, which 
is social inclusion across groups.”293 And despite appeals to social 
inclusion for harmed workers made by criminalization advocates, it is 
not clear that criminal enforcement would or could advance those ends. 
Indeed, one major concern in using criminal law to address wage theft 
is that workers (particularly undocumented workers who face 
deportation) might actually suffer as a result of law enforcement 
intervention in their workplaces.294 That is, the outsider and marginal 
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 292 See Kate Levine & Benjamin Levin, Redistributing Justice (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author); cf. Gruber, A Distributive Theory, supra note 72, at 16 
(arguing that criminal law does distributive work, but in terms of distributing pain and, 
perhaps, pleasure, not power or resources). 
 293 Bell, Police Reform, supra note 169, at 2087. 
 294 Cf. Chris Bragg, Amid Wage Fight with Guilderland Restaurant, Cook Is Seized by 
ICE Agents, TIMES UNION (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.timesunion.com/news/article/ 
In-fight-with-Albany-restaurant-cook-is-seized-14371045.php [https://perma.cc/8557-
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status of the workers might remain, even if their status as “crime 
victims” were solidified.295  
Intentionally or not, proponents of wage theft criminalization are 
providing positive reinforcement for a punitive, prosecutorial impulse 
that strengthens the institutions of the carceral state. At the same time 
that activists, academics, and politicians across the political spectrum 
are fighting to rein in the punitive drive that defined decades of carceral 
policies and politics, the arguments by criminalization proponents 
reflect a troubling retrenchment. Rather than thinking outside of the 
box or the rubric of “governing through crime,”296 advocates for 
workers’ rights have doubled down on the politics of the carceral state. 
Former New York State labor enforcement attorney Terri Gerstein, for 
example, argues that increasing wage theft prosecutions should be a 
priority of progressive voters: 
There are scores of district-attorney seats in play in November, 
as well as over 30 state-attorney general elections. Criminal-
justice advocates have rightly set their sights on these races, 
hoping to unseat some of the district attorneys whose “tough 
on crime” policies tend to be limited to offenses like drug 
violations or traffic infractions. Yet these contests also present 
an opportunity to elect leaders who understand the importance 
of judiciously using criminal law to address serious employer 
abuses, like wage theft, sexual assault, and utterly avoidable 
workplace injuries and fatalities.297 
The message is not that “progressive prosecutors” should be engaged in 
a project of decarceration and dialing back the apparatus and 
institutions of criminal enforcement. Instead, it is that being a 
progressive prosecutor means prosecuting more aggressively some class 
of crimes that progressives care more about. The question remains, of 
course, “care more about than what?” 
This position reflects a troublingly narrow view of just what’s wrong 
with the U.S. criminal legal system. Criticizing mass incarceration has 
 
AC39] (describing the case of an undocumented Chinese immigrant who was seized by 
ICE after testifying against his employer in a civil wage-theft suit). See generally Lee, 
supra note 13 (discussing the various hardships undocumented workers face when 
employers steal their wages).  
 295 Cf. Roberts, Victims, Right?, supra note 89 (manuscript at 5) (arguing for an 
abolitionist conception of victimhood that focuses on harm, rather than lawbreaking).  
 296 See generally SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME, supra note 21 (discussing the 
use of criminal law as a response to social problems). 
 297 Gerstein, Stealing from Workers Is a Crime, supra note 73. 
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become a staple of academic, political, and popular discourse. And, 
particularly among progressives and those on the left, signaling disgust 
with the contemporary state of the criminal system has become a means 
of shoring up political bona fides. Indeed, with the popularity of 
Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow and Ava DuVernay’s 13th,298 
not to mention the consciousness-raising of the Movement for Black 
Lives, “structural racism” has entered the vernacular and being anti-
mass incarceration has become a practical requirement of being an 
early-twenty-first-century progressive.299  
But what exactly does it mean to be against mass incarceration if one 
is quick to turn to criminal law solutions? The next Part takes up that 
question. 
IV. CARCERAL PROGRESSIVISM 
In this final Part, I step back to ask how we can or should reconcile 
the drive for wage theft criminalization with the stated 
left/egalitarian/redistributive politics of proponents. Over the past few 
decades, legal scholars have focused more and more attention on the 
political economy of criminal law. Frequently, those treatments 
emphasize the relationship between mass incarceration and the forces 
of neoliberalism.300 “Liberal market economies,” Darryl Brown 
contends, “not only favor weaker social safety nets and less regulated 
markets, they also tend to rely more on imprisonment as an instrument 
of social order.”301 In these accounts, criminal law or “neoliberal 
penality” actually coincides with deregulatory policies. That is, 
advocates of deregulation come to endorse criminal punishment as the 
 
 298 13TH (Kandoo Films 2016). 
 299 Popular press outlets increasingly use the phrase, accompanied by broader 
critiques of the criminal system as perpetuating white supremacy. See, e.g., Ben Austen, 
In Philadelphia, a Progressive D.A. Tests the Power — and Learns the Limits — of His 
Office, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/30/magazine/ 
larry-krasner-philadelphia-district-attorney-progressive.html [https://perma.cc/R7BY-
F659]; Leah Sakala & Nicole D. Porter, Opinion, Criminal Justice Reform Doesn’t End 
System’s Racial Bias, USA TODAY (Dec. 12, 2018, 7:55 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/policing/politics-policing/2018/12/12/racial-
injustice-criminal-justice-reform-racism-prison/2094674002/ [https://perma.cc/GNX4-
9XRA]; Serena Sonoma, Study Shows Police Shootings Are Hurting Black People’s Mental 
Health, TEEN VOGUE (July 11, 2018), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/study-shows-
police-shootings-are-hurting-black-peoples-mental-health [https://perma.cc/FE5E-4LHC]. 
 300 See sources cited supra note 18.  
 301 BROWN, supra note 18, at 207. 
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sole acceptable province of the state and of state regulatory force.302 A 
turn towards harsher and more intrusive criminal law complements, 
rather than contradicts, a deregulatory turn in the civil or administrative 
realms.303 I find that account compelling, but it has little to say about 
pro-regulatory forces. It explains how the advocates of deregulation on 
the right and in the neoliberal recesses of the center-left have come to 
embrace criminal law. Yet, how can or should we understand the role 
of the left (broadly conceived) in the rise of the carceral state?304 Or, put 
differently, what is the relationship between pro-regulatory policy 
positions and attitudes toward mass incarceration?305 
That relationship is one of I have explored in past work,306 and one 
which I plan to explore at much greater length in future work. Here, 
though, I simply wish to note briefly the ways in which Progressivism 
(in the capital “P” sense) and a punitive impulse have much in common. 
Contemporary left-liberalism/progressivism tends to embrace 
decarceral language and critiques of the criminal system.307 Yet, time 
and again, progressive commentators endorse carceral ends as a means 
of addressing inequality and social problems about which they care.308 
As Aya Gruber explains this dynamic: 
On the one hand, critical race and feminist scholars are by and 
large vocal critics of the American penal state. The critique 
primarily comes in the form of observations about the 
authoritarian criminal justice apparatus’s punitive, masculinist 
nature and disproportionate effects on minority men. On the 
other hand, much of left-leaning criminal law scholarship 
involves identifying various crimes against minorities and 
women (domestic violence, rape, hate crimes, etc.), exposing 
 
 302 See, e.g., Harcourt, supra note 9, at 40-44 (“Neoliberal penality facilitates passing 
new criminal statutes and wielding the penal sanction more liberally because that is 
where government is necessary, that is where the state can legitimately act, that is the 
proper and competent sphere of politics.”).  
 303 See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 18, at 185 (“In contrast to a general skepticism of 
government power, that popular endorsement reflects a strong, basic trust in the state’s 
criminal justice administration, and especially in its strong version of executive 
enforcement discretion.”). 
 304 See sources cited supra note 26. 
 305 Cf. Douglas N. Husak, Guns and Drugs: Case Studies on the Principled Limits of the 
Criminal Sanction, 23 LAW & PHIL. 437, 445 (2004) [hereinafter Guns and Drugs: Case 
Studies] (noting potential tensions). 
 306 See sources cited supra note 25. 
 307 See supra Part III.B. 
 308 See Gruber, When Theory Met Practice, supra note 207; Levin, Mens Rea Reform, 
supra note 25, at 529. 
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the lackluster police and prosecutorial responses to such 
crimes, and calling for reforms targeted toward increasing 
arrests, prosecutions, convictions, and sentence severity. Thus, 
left-leaning legal scholars are in the contradictory position of 
regarding the U.S. criminal system as cruel, sexist, racist, and 
unfair, but investing more power in that very system in the hope 
of reducing crime against minorities.309  
So, what should we make of this contradiction, this punitive preference 
framed in critical terms? 
This carceral turn might be, and has been, explained in terms of 
interest convergence (i.e., criminal law might not have been the first 
choice, but it reflected a compromise with other powerful actors) and 
in terms of carve-outs (i.e., there is a core decarceral commitment, but 
for some reason an exception should be or has been made in this area). 
These explanations for progressive support for punitive policies are 
appealing and help explain various political and academic moves over 
the years.310 Perhaps they might even explain the carceral turn among 
workers’ rights proponents.  
First, take interest convergence: as Derrick Bell famously argued, 
structural racism and inequality generally prevented the powerless and 
the marginalized from winning formal legal victories; but, when the 
interests of the powerless converged with those of more powerful 
actors, formal legal and political victories could be won.311 Importantly, 
though, Bell and generations of critical scholars have shown that these 
apparent legal victories for minorities often go a long way towards 
advancing the interests of the powerful.312 As in the example involving 
 
 309 Gruber, When Theory Met Practice, supra note 207 (footnotes omitted). 
 310 Indeed, as noted above, I have endorsed both explanations elsewhere. See Levin, 
Guns and Drugs, supra note 25, at 2215-16; Levin, Mens Rea Reform, supra note 25, at 
529-30. 
 311 See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE 
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 165-78 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004). 
 312 See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1624 
(2003) (stating that meaningful relief only came once those in power decided that 
ending discrimination furthered more important policies); Elizabeth F. Emens, 
Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839, 916 (2008) (discussing how 
accommodations for disabled people also provides a benefit to non-disabled people); 
Gruber, Equal Protection, supra note 226, at 1365-66 (“A poignant example is domestic 
violence reform, where feminists’ interest in fair treatment of female victims converged 
with prosecutors’ interest in punishing batterers, resulting in punitive policies that 
actually devalued and materially harmed women. Lawmakers’ and other state actors’ 
receptivity to disparity claims vary by their interests, and the criminal arena is one in 
which punitive interests are ascendant.”); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law 
and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1764 (2003) (reviewing 
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Attorney General Sessions and transgender rights,313 perhaps this is a 
place where interests converge between a powerful group (i.e., 
advocates of law and order) and a less powerful group (i.e., advocates 
for low-wage workers). Political gridlock and polarization might make 
other regulatory approaches impracticable, but the power of the pro-
prosecution lobby makes criminalization an ever-attractive option. Or, 
it is not that criminal law is the desired solution to a social problem; it 
is that political realities make criminal law the only meaningful 
option.314  
Second, the carve-out or exceptionalization thesis suggests that 
reform advocates may still adopt “tough-on-crime” views when 
confronted with specific areas of criminal law that they view as 
“different.”315 This pattern often plays out in areas where there is 
perceived to be a history of underenforcement or where the victim is 
viewed as particularly vulnerable, and the defendant particularly 
powerful or unsympathetic.316 Elsewhere, I have described this 
 
FRANCISCO VALDES, JEROME MCCRISTAL CULP & ANGELA P. HARRIS, CROSSROADS, 
DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Temple University Press 2002)) 
(discussing interest convergence in the employment context); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., 
Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. 
L. REV. 518, 524-25 (1980) (explaining Brown in terms of interest convergence). 
 313 See supra notes 287–88 and accompanying text. 
 314 See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 20, at 12-13; Elizabeth Hinton, Julilly Kohler-
Hausmann & Vesla M. Weaver, Opinion, Did Blacks Really Endorse the 1994 Crime Bill?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/13/opinion/did-blacks-
really-endorse-the-1994-crime-bill.html [https://perma.cc/YJ8F-RQFA] (“Policy 
makers pointed to black support for greater punishment and surveillance, without 
recognizing accompanying demands to redirect power and economic resources to low-
income minority communities.”). 
 315 See Husak, The Price of Criminal Law Skepticism, supra note 121, at 51-52 (“Even 
those members of the public who tend to agree that the criminal justice system punishes 
too many persons with too much severity can be heard to complain when leniency is 
afforded to certain kinds of offenders. . . . Among liberals, justice is said to be denied 
when police are not punished for using excessive force against unarmed minorities, 
when prosecutors are reluctant to indict white collar criminals, or when sexual 
offenders escape their just deserts.”). 
 316 See, e.g., Ely Aharonson, “Pro-Minority” Criminalization and the Transformation of 
Visions of Citizenship in Contemporary Liberal Democracies: A Critique, 13 NEW CRIM. L. 
REV. 286, 287 (2010) (discussing how social movements have resorted to 
criminalization campaigns to advance social equality); Hadar Aviram, Progressive 
Punitivism: Notes on the Use of Punitive Social Control to Advance Social Justice Ends, 68 
BUFF. L. REV. 199, 202 (2020) (defining progressive punitivism as “a logic that wields 
the classic weapons of punitive law — shaming, stigmatization, harsh punishment, and 
denial of rehabilitation — in the service of promoting social equality”); Stuntz, supra 
note 170, at 507 (“[C]riminal law’s breadth is old news. It has long been a source of 
academic complaint; indeed, it has long been the starting point for virtually all the 
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phenomenon as “carceral exceptionalism” because it appears to reflect 
an understandably human, but also troubling impulse to suggest that 
one’s particular problem or area of concern merits a solution that is 
uncalled-for in other areas.317 In the context of wage theft, think of the 
ways in which criminalization proponents have stressed the power 
dynamic between workers and bosses, the relative social standing of the 
defendants, and the harm done to victims as ways of explaining why 
wage theft is different from other areas of criminal law.318 
Interest convergence and carceral exceptionalism are helpful 
explanatory frames that shed light on the move to push for 
criminalization of wage theft. Nevertheless, I think they miss another 
important possibility: that progressive proponents of criminalization 
truly are enthusiastic. That is, criminalization might not be a last-ditch 
compromise, a cynical calculation, or a solution arrived at after 
grappling with the broader flaws of mass incarceration. Instead, perhaps 
criminalization — for some progressive activists, advocates, and 
scholars — stands as the apotheosis of what they believe the state 
should do.319 Rather than a least-worst regulatory solution, 
criminalization is the right way to address deeply immoral employer 
conduct. Indeed, in numerous calls for prosecution, commentators 
observe that regulatory agencies have investigated and punished 
employers, but that the punishment strikes them (the commentators) 
as insufficient to deter future theft.320 
 
scholarship in this field, which (with the important exception of sexual assault) 
consistently argues that existing criminal liability rules are too broad and ought to be 
narrowed.”). 
 317 See Levin, Mens Rea Reform, supra note 25, at 548-49. In other work, Aya Gruber 
and I describe this same phenomenon as reflecting a willingness to create “carve outs.” 
See Aya Gruber & Benjamin Levin, Abolitionisms (Sept. 27, 2019) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author); see also Aya Gruber, #MeToo and Mass Incarceration, 
17 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 275, 279 (2020) (“How come gender crime gets a carve-out from 
or even veto over criminal justice reform?”).  
 318 See supra Part II.B.  
 319 Cf. HAY, supra note 278, at 62 (“The sanction of the state is force . . . .”).  
 320 See, e.g., Luke Darby, Is Your Employer Stealing from You?, GQ (Nov. 8, 2019), 
https://www.gq.com/story/wage-theft [https://perma.cc/4KTZ-FSRM] (arguing that jail 
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opting for a less aggressive course of action.) Fines, however, do not always deter bad 
employers, said Chris Woods, executive vice president of health-care union District 
1199C, who advocated for the unit’s creation.”). 
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The possibility of progressive enthusiasm finds purchase in 
scholarship on white-collar crime that stresses the particular appeals of 
punishment to U.S. voters. James Whitman, for example, has argued 
that the U.S. appetite for white-collar punishment differs from many 
European approaches and can be traced to a particular brand of 
populism.321 Similarly, Miriam Baer has described the ways that 
punishment holds both psychological and rhetorical advantages over 
non-criminal regulatory approaches to corporate misfeasance.322 Put 
simply, it is much easier to understand that a wealthy actor has broken 
the law and will lose her liberty, than it is to appreciate the intricacies 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or the terms of a U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission settlement agreement.  
The distinction between pragmatic necessity and ideological 
commitment may well be a significant one.323 If the problem were 
simply one of mobilization, organizing, or garnering sufficient votes, 
then the solution might sound in political adjustments. Such 
adjustments are, of course, easier said than done. But they suggest that 
there is a real agreed upon goal, and that goal is not punitive or carceral 
in nature. Criminal law is a result of “pathological politics,” which, if 
fixed, might give way to a more effective welfare state and more effective 
non-criminal regulatory solutions.324 Advocates have turned to criminal 
law simply because of an otherwise limited menu of options.325 Reading 
the rhetoric of wage theft criminalization proponents (and, many other 
progressive commenters addressing progressive criminalization 
projects), though, it is difficult to conclude that incarceration is not the 
real end goal.326 
 
 321 JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING 
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 7-10, 47, 80-82 (2003).  
 322 See Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 581 (2012) 
[hereinafter Choosing Punishment]. 
 323 Of course, the distinction often might not be so clear, and there might be good 
reason to think that a punitive impulse coexists with a pragmatic preference. 
 324 See Stuntz, supra note 170, at 521 (describing criminal law’s pathological 
politics). 
 325 See generally LISA L. MILLER, THE MYTH OF MOB RULE: VIOLENT CRIME & 
DEMOCRATIC POLITICS (Oxford Univ. Press 2016) (arguing that voters’ preference for 
criminal law often results from a limited set of non-criminal choices). 
 326 Perhaps this characterization isn’t fair: maybe the rhetoric I identify is simply the 
product of political necessity and an attempt to frame arguments in a way that will be 
as emotionally resonant as possible. One doesn’t make a bounded call to action in this 
age of social media. Perhaps, but the claim that proponents don’t really mean what they 
say shouldn’t do much work for two reasons. First, if that’s the case, the legitimation 
concerns outlined above should be a major problem — arguing for incarceration when 
you don’t really mean it sends a bad message and reinforces our cultural belief that 
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 Much criminal law scholarship operates from a starting assumption 
that criminal law should be a tool of last resort and that the turn to 
governance through crime reflects a major social failing. Meanwhile, 
scholars of white-collar and regulatory crime have bemoaned the socio-
political forces that have led to criminal law, rather than civil or 
regulatory measures becoming the dominant paradigm for addressing 
misfeasance by market actors.327 The arguments described in Parts II 
and III, though, reflect a very different world view — a view that 
criminal law is the right (and perhaps natural) vehicle for addressing 
bad conduct or social problems.328 
My claim here is that a strong strand of Progressive thought and 
political action views criminal law as an appropriate and desirable way 
of regulating. To a certain extent, this is an historical and theoretical 
argument that requires much more space than this Part and this Article 
afford. Yet, from the Temperance Movement, to the rise of federal 
criminal law during the Roosevelt administration, to the movements to 
address race- and gender-based violence, a substantial strand in 
Progressive thought treats criminal law as the gold standard in the 
regulator project — the ultimate signal of the state’s moral force, and 
 
accountability and incarceration are synonymous. But, second, I think that hiding 
behind pragmatism undersells the sort of righteous indignation motivating the calls to 
criminalize wage theft. Substantial political capital is being spent on encouraging 
prosecutions and amping up statutory penalties. That is political capital that could be 
spent elsewhere on other projects designed to address economic inequality. Cf. Gruber, 
When Theory Met Practice, supra note 207 (“Liberal faith in the criminal apparatus as a 
solution to the problems of racial and gender subordination may serve to legitimize our 
status quo criminal system, strengthen the discourse of individualism that prevents 
greater institutional change, and distribute scholarly capital away from emphasizing the 
structural nature of racial and gender oppression.”); Dean Spade, Their Laws Will Never 
Make Us Safer, in AGAINST EQUALITY: PRISONS WILL NOT PROTECT YOU 4-9 (Ryan Conrad 
ed., 2012). And, as I argue more generally in this Part, I think such an appeal to 
pragmatism fails to take criminalization proponents at their word and to recognize the 
strong ideological and moral claim that underpins their prosecutorial impulse. 
 327 See, e.g., Baer, Choosing Punishment, supra note 322 (discussing societal 
preference for criminal punishment over civil regulation); Darryl K. Brown, Criminal 
Law’s Unfortunate Triumph over Administrative Law, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 657 (2011) 
(arguing that criminal law has wrongly been used for regulatory tasks that should be 
governed by civil law mechanisms); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean 
“Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 
B.U. L. REV. 193, 198 (1991) (describing trends that have led to the expansion of 
criminal law). 
 328 See SAMUEL W. BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN 
AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE 231-32 (2016) (suggesting that skepticism about 
criminalizing financial misconduct is not “widely shared” outside of conservative, 
business friendly spaces). 
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the ultimate signal that the morality of the state maps onto a broader 
reformist (or P/progressive) vision of society.  
Framed in this way, the liberal-progressive flirtation with anti-
carceral politics, then, might be more an anomaly or historical 
contingency then a defining political feature. The association of some 
broadly conceived left with an anti-prosecutorial or pro-defendant ethos 
might have more to do with the practical realities of “criminal justice” 
in the United States than with any fundamental skepticism about 
prosecution or punitivism. That is, the administration of criminal law 
may have been problematic as a manifestation of deep racism and 
classism (see, for example, the Warren Court’s targeting of notoriously 
racist state criminal enforcement).329 But, incarceration and criminal 
prosecution were hardly antithetical to the P/progressive project. In 
fact, prosecution might have been essential to advancing a certain vision 
of progressive governance.  
My suggestion is that we might (and perhaps should) understand a 
significant strand of historical Progressivism as — first and foremost — 
defined by its statism. Society is beset by many problems, and the state 
should be there to fix them. If that is a fair statement of purpose, then 
it should cause little surprise that progressive criminalization 
proponents do not see the internal flaws of the carceral state and its 
prosecutorial apparatus as deal breakers; instead, they call for the 
institutions’ improvement, for better technocratic approaches, or better 
democratic inputs. 
Perhaps this entire discussion might highlight the ways in which 
much writing and thinking about criminal law reflects an uncritical 
acceptance of the criminalization/regulation distinction. To libertarian 
critics, criminal law might be particularly objectionable precisely 
because it is viewed as the most obtrusive form of regulation or state 
 
 329 See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 48, 93 (2000) (“[I]t is erroneous to conceive of these landmark criminal 
procedure cases as instances of judicial protection of minority rights from majoritarian 
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Jordan M. Steiker, A Tale of Two Nations: Implementation of the Death Penalty in 
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Justin Driver, Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 929, 929 (2014) (critiquing the 
scholarly focus on “outliers”). 
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intervention.330 Yet, many commentators on the left (broadly 
conceived) tend to treat non-criminal regulation as a social good, while 
expressing skepticism about the criminal system. But, to channel the 
insights of the legal realists (if not Hayek), the state is always waiting to 
enforce non-criminal regulations. And that means the police powers 
and the prospect of state violence are inextricable from any regulatory 
project.331 Or, put differently, “[t]he police power should be appreciated 
in its comprehensiveness as a mode of governance, rather than a 
particular variety of governmental regulation.”332 
To be clear, I do not purport to argue that Progressivism is or has 
been the dominant ethos or driving ideology of the carceral state’s 
rise.333 Mass incarceration has grown as the result of competing and at-
times complementary social, political, and economic forces.334 Rather, I 
simply mean to suggest that we might identify a strand running through 
decades of progressive policies as reflecting a view that the nation needs 
the progressive prosecutor (or, perhaps more accurately, the 
prosecutorial progressive) to bring the forces of inequity and injustice 
to heel.  
For example, in her aptly titled call for corporate criminal 
accountability, Why Not Jail?, law professor and founder of the Center 
for Progressive Reform, Rena Steinzor, argues that prosecutors err when 
they fail to exercise their full punitive power.335 Steinzor contends that 
they are properly viewed as “police ensuring consequences for the past,” 
rather than “policymakers” who should decline prosecutions.336 Where 
 
 330 Cf. Husak, Guns and Drugs: Case Studies, supra note 305, at 445 n.28 (suggesting 
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Valverde eds., 2008) (“That the differentiated risks posed by capitalist labor, urban 
space, transportation, moral and social threats, and later, sites and substances identified 
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 335 See STEINZOR, supra note 257, at 275. 
 336 Id. 
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half a century of criminal law scholarship reflects a fear that criminal 
law has metastasized and prosecutors have found ways to prosecute 
almost anyone for anything, Steinzor decries “[t]he legal profession’s 
disinterest in pushing the criminal law’s application out to the frontier 
of [large scale corporate in misfeasance in mining and other dangerous 
activities]” as “discredit[ing] a fundamentally cautious and tradition-
bound profession that seems chronically unable to think outside the 
box.”337 Instead of advancing theories of expansive criminal liability 
(which they should do), in this account, “law professors . . . debat[e] at 
tedious length whether such prosecutions are a good idea.”338  
Steinzor, like many wage theft criminalization proponents decries the 
racial and socioeconomic inequities of the U.S. criminal system.339 Yet 
those are not problems that cut to the quick of the prosecutorial project 
or in any way delegitimize the carceral turn. As in Gerstein’s call for 
progressive prosecutors to prioritize wage theft, the common critiques 
of mass incarceration do not dampen the progressive faith that 
prosecutors remain suited to serve as the voice of the public, that 
criminal court rooms are truly sites of justice, or that prisons are 
acceptable vehicles for humane punishment.340 Demands for greater 
corporate accountability are framed in terms of “haul[ing] out 
[executives] in handcuffs.”341 And prosecutors who fail to bring charges 
or obtain carceral sentences are decried as members of the “chickenshit 
club.”342  
In these accounts, there is little space devoted to collateral 
consequences, to the realities of prison, or to what punishment will 
actually look like. There is little talk of who else stands to gain in 
expanding and further legitimating criminal law’s reach — the police, 
the prison administrators, the bondsmen, et al. — and others who will 
lose. Put simply, the carceral progressive project takes at face value the 
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claims of institutional legitimacy. (Or, perhaps phrased differently, the 
threat to the criminal system’s legitimacy comes from a failure to 
prosecute sufficiently and effectively, not from the overuse of the 
prosecutorial or carceral toolkit.) This is law-and-order politics. It’s just 
a preference for a different set of laws, accompanied by a different vision 
of order.  
CONCLUSION 
We live in a society where economic inequality is endemic and where 
structures of governance often serve to exacerbate, rather than address 
that inequality. Wage theft stands as one of many practices that serve to 
hurt workers and enrich bosses. But, the preference for criminal law as 
a means of advancing equality and protecting the marginalized in the 
context of wage theft should be as concerning as the criminal turn 
elsewhere.  
The turn to criminal law as a means of curbing capitalism’s abuses 
should help us appreciate critical fault lines on the Left. For proponents 
of abolition or widescale decarceration, the criminal turn here should 
represent a misguided reliance on law-and-order politics and faith in 
criminal legal institutions. For many progressives, though, the criminal 
turn represents a much-needed signal that the state can and should take 
seriously its job of redistribution and protecting the marginalized. And, 
for many relatively powerless victims of wage theft, turning to the 
prosecutorial apparatus might provide some specter of accountability 
for abusive bosses.  
Ultimately, I argue that the criminal turn here represents a troubling 
manifestation of “carceral progressivism” — an affinity for criminal law 
as a means of achieving regulatory and redistributive ends. Progressive 
proponents of wage theft criminalization may decry mass incarceration, 
but as I have argued, their punitive project reinforces and legitimates 
the inequities of the carceral state. Critics and skeptics of the carceral 
state should be careful of adopting this punitive approach simply 
because the politics of wage theft appear different, other regulatory 
approaches have failed, or the moral wrong appears clear. In doing so, 
they understate the ways in which our contemporary criminal system 
rests on a belief that prosecutors vindicate the interests of the vulnerable 
and that accountability and incarceration are synonymous. Challenging 
those beliefs is a central component of any true project of decarceration. 
But challenging those beliefs may also run headlong into a Progressive 
vision of the state as social savior. 
